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INTRODUCTION
This Article proposes that COVID-19 prison and jail conditions
litigation provide insights into how federal courts may analyze future
climate-related prison and jail litigation. The global COVID-19 pandemic
and the exogenous threats associated with global climate change differ in
critical ways. However, both pose grave public health hazards to people
worldwide yet pose a greater risk of serious harm to prison and jail
residents because they are confined without the physical ability to mitigate
on their own or at all. Plaintiffs in both suit types will bring the same
claims and types of actions to enforce their right to be free from illegal
conditions of confinement or disability-based discrimination. Both will
seek preliminary relief. To prevail, both will need to overcome the same
thorny jurisdictional and remedial barriers imposed by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act (PLRA) or habeas statutes. Observations about outcomes in
COVID-19 prison and jail conditions litigation — when considered
together with geographic projections of future climate change-related harm
that predict the U.S. South will be hardest hit — suggest that prison and jail
residents living in the Fifth and Eleventh Federal Circuit Courts of
Appeals, who are disproportionately Black Americans, may be particularly
disadvantaged when seeking preliminary relief from life-threatening
climate-related crises.
The Article first discusses three ways that climate change can harm
prison and jail residents, and by extension their home communities, with
uniquely adverse impacts in the U.S. South. The Article then provides an
analysis of the structure, claims, and relative success of a group of 70
COVID-19 prison and jail conditions cases, filed in 2020 and 2021, seeking
preliminary or emergency injunctive relief or release on behalf of multiple
persons. The Article concludes that prison and jail residents in most parts
of the country will have difficulty using the courts to obtain preliminary
relief to prevent climate-related injuries and harms, and that Black
Americans in custody in the U.S. South — particularly in states within the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits — are overrepresented within an
underprotected population that is uniquely at risk of climate-related harm.
I. THREE WAYS THAT CLIMATE CHANGE CAN HARM PRISON AND JAIL
RESIDENTS AND, BY EXTENSION, HOME COMMUNITIES
Millions of prison and jail residents1 in the United States are living
through an era of record-breaking heatwaves, increasingly destructive
1. This Article uses, among others, the term “prison resident” to refer to individuals
who are incarcerated; the term “incarcerated community” to refer to people who reside in
the same prison or jail facility at the same time; and the term “home community” to refer to

262

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIX

floods, more frequent and deadlier storms, deeper freezes, and dangerous
weather-related infrastructure failures. However, individual prison and jail
residents and imprisoned communities are prohibited from engaging in
climate-adaptive behavior while warehoused in locked facilities, so they
are uniquely vulnerable to climate change-related harms.2 For example,
prison residents cannot prepare for the increased likelihood of episodic
resource scarcity or extreme weather conditions by taking basic steps to
reduce harm, like planning ahead or getting out of harm’s way. They
cannot collect and keep emergency supplies or work towards achieving a
higher degree of self-sufficiency for meeting their own or their loved ones’
basic needs. They cannot plan collectively at the community level to
develop mutual aid-sharing plans. Prison facilities are run by prison
officials who do not live alongside them and are not accountable to them.
Many residents have been stripped of the right to vote while in prison,
impairing access to standard political channels to press for their
communities’ interests at a political level.
Prison and jail residents are thus prevented from protecting themselves
and each other from potentially harmful impacts of climate change, and
forced to rely on institutional personnel, structures, and practices that are
largely outside of their control. This Article discusses three reasons why:
(1) chronic understaffing will worsen in the face of climate-driven
occupational hazards and economic pressures; (2) dangerously
deteriorating and under-maintained facilities are becoming more deadly;
and (3) racial disparities in incarcerated populations are increasing.

the communities where prison residents lived prior to incarceration, to which they will likely
return post-release. Referring to people by their temporary custodial status, i.e., prisoner,
inmate, detainee, offender, could obscure one of the aims of this Article — to discuss how
prison conditions impact people after their imprisonment, and how they impact people who
were never imprisoned, including families and communities who may struggle with a loved
ones’ trauma, illness, or death related to conditions of confinement during or after a period
of incarceration.
2. Imprisoning individuals creates a manufactured relationship of complete resource
dependency between individuals and the state, such that people cannot protect themselves in
the most fundamental of ways. See, e.g., Georgina Rannard, Hurricane Florence: Prisons in
Hurricane’s
Path
Not
Evacuated,
BBC
NEWS
(Sept.
13,
2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45509303
[https://perma.cc/4VLG-SVCN];
Michael Patrick Welch, Hurricane Katrina Was a Nightmare for Inmates in New Orleans,
VICE (Aug. 29, 2015, 1:56 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/5gjdxn/hurricane-katrinawas-a-nightmare-for-inmates-in-new-orleans-829
[https://perma.cc/9FBR-8ZBM]
(describing the night Hurricane Katrina hit the Orleans Parish Jail with over 1,000 detainees
trapped inside: first the jail’s generators failed, then all the lights went out, the underventilated jail became stifling, and the storm hit, sounding to a guard “like the building was
gonna come down”).
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These harms will have wide-ranging impacts, beyond prison walls, in
urban and rural communities alike.3 The United States has the highest
incarceration rate in the world and is home to the highest number of
incarcerated individuals on the planet.4 Many prison residents have family
at home who need them. The overwhelming majority will return to their
home communities from prison, and the conditions they experience inside
prisons will shape who they can be for those they come home to.5 When
prison residents are injured, disabled, traumatized,6 or die as a result of

3. See, e.g., Jerry Mitchell, Inside the Prison Where Inmates Set Each Other on Fire
and Gangs Have More Power than Guards, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 19, 2019, 1:00 PM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/leakesville-south-mississippi-correctional-institutionprison-gangs [https://perma.cc/MYU7-FAGS] (proving that prison officials must use
lockdowns to maintain order due to inadequate staffing, but that extended lockdowns
“create ‘an unsafe environment for . . . staff’”); Sonya R. Porter, Johhn L. Voorheis &
William Sabol, Correctional Facility and Inmate Locations: Urban and Rural Status
Patterns 9–11 (U.S. Census Bureau Ctr. For Admin. Recs. Rsch. And Applications,
Working
Paper
2017-08,
2017),
https://www.census.gov/
content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2017/adrm/carra-wp-2017-08.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2E4S-HVGJ] (discussing their definitions and data analysis approach to
interpreting Census Bureau data that the authors interpret as showing (1) that 87 percent of
prison residents lived in urban zip codes prior to incarceration; (2) that about 50 percent of
prison residents who lived in urban areas prior to incarceration were incarcerated in a prison
in a rural area; and (3) a majority of state prisons and prisoners, which house the largest
number of prisoners, are located in rural areas).
4. United States Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.
org/profiles/US.html [https://perma.cc/JU7H-Z6ZJ] (last visited Sept. 9, 2021) (“With over
two million people behind bars at any given time, the United States has the highest
incarceration rate of any country in the world.”).
5. In the United States, as of this writing, incarceration is more than twenty-fold more
common than hospitalization for COVID-19; this comparison (of incidence proportion to
incidence proportion) may help illustrate for readers whose friends and family have not been
disproportionately targeted for incarceration due to race or class the ubiquitous nature of
incarceration in the United States. Compare TODD D. MINTON, LAUREN G. BEATTY & ZHEN
ZENG, BUREAU JUST. STAT., NCJ 300655, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES,
2019-STATISTICAL
TABLES
1
(2021),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh236/files/media/document/cpus19st.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7QQ2-XN5T] (showing that the most recent, and lowest since 1991, U.S.
incarceration rate is 2,480 per 100,000 of adults under correctional supervision), with Rates
of COVID-19-Associated Hospitalization, Preliminary Weekly Rates as of Jan 08, 2022,
CTRS.
FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
https://gis.cdc.gov/grasp/covidnet/covid19_3.html [https://perma.cc/SG4B-LY74] (last
visted Jan. 18, 2022) (showing that the peak weekly hospitalization rate for the week ending
on January 9, 2022, was 111.8 per 100,000 people across the United States).
6. For people living every day for years inside violent facilities lacking core
operational capabilities, sometimes in conditions amounting to solitary confinement, the
psychological impacts can last a lifetime. See, e.g., Meghan A. Novisky & Robert L. Peralta,
“Gladiator School: Returning Citizens’ Experiences with Secondary Violence Exposure in
Prison,” 15 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 1, 18 (2020) (finding that exposure to prison violence
undermines rehabilitation, reentry, and lifetime mental and physical health of the
incarcerated). Prison conditions-related trauma can compromise a reentering citizen’s ability
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exposure to climate-related impacts, it exacerbates the already
overwhelmingly negative intergenerational impacts of incarceration in their
homes and communities.7
A. Understaffing
Understaffing is a root cause of many unconstitutional conditions in
prisons.8 Climate change will make it even harder than it is now to fully

to take care of themselves and loved ones and to learn, work, and thrive. See, e.g., Johanna
E. Elumn Madera, The Cumulative Impact of Trauma Exposure and Recidivism After
Incarceration Among Black Men (Sept. 2016) (Ph.D. dissertation, City University of New
York), https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2588&context=gc_etds
[https://perma.cc/DL7R-HPMA] (finding that the symptoms associated with trauma
exposure that many formerly incarcerated people have when returning from prison can
interfere with their ability to “reconnect with family, interact with parole/probation, stay free
from drugs/alcohol, or find and maintain stable housing and employment”). In this way,
unconstitutional conditions in U.S. prisons have had intergenerational impacts, including of
persistent poverty and vicarious trauma. See, e.g., Ram Sundaresh et al., Exposure to Family
Member Incarceration and Adult Well-Being in the United States, JAMA NETWORK (May
28,
2021),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jamanetworkopen/fullarticle/2780438
[https://perma.cc/4F67-CFGD] (concluding that having one or more family members in
prison is associated with disproportionately lower household income, higher rates of drug or
alcohol addiction, and shorter average life expectancy for family members in the
community).
7. See, e.g., Manudeep Bhuller et al., Intergenerational Effects of Incarceration 1–12
(Nat’l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Rsch.,
Working
Paper
No. 24227, 2018),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w24227 [https://perma.cc/UZ89-M6PY] (documenting that the
impact of parental incarceration can spillover into the lives of children, creating emotional
trauma, increasing social stigma and alienation, and imposing financial hardships on the
family). Harms of trauma, injury, disability, or death to prison residents, who number in the
millions in the United States, accrue to the families and home communities to which prison
residents are tied and to which they will return. The absence of prison residents in families
and home communities is ubiquitous, and harm to prison residents is replicated through
those ties: a child without a parent to provide day-to-day connection and support; a family
making do with much less; a workplace or church without the absent individual’s wisdom,
inventiveness, or knowhow for solving particular problems; the loss of kinship and
mentorship ties. See, e.g., Eric Martin, Hidden Consequences: The Impact of Incarceration
on
Dependent
Children,
NAT’L
INST.
JUST.
J.
(Mar.
2017),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250349.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZG5X-WGGU]
(documenting that children who have parents or caregivers who are incarcerated poses
threats to children’s emotional, physical, educational and financial well-being and places
children at higher risk for criminal involvement, psychological problems and antisocial
behavior, difficulties with educational attainment, economic well-being, and maintaining
familial connections and relationships).
8. In April 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division issued a report
in which it cited the Alabama Department of Corrections (ADOC) for “egregious” and
“dangerous” systemwide understaffing that contributed to likely violations of the Eighth
Amendment
rights
of
Alabama
prisoners.
See
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF ALABAMA’S STATE PRISONS FOR MEN 9–10 (2019)
[hereinafter ALABAMA’S STATE PRISONS INVESTIGATION], https://www.justice.gov/crt/casedocument/file/1149971/download [https://perma.cc/8HT4-VZZF].
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staff prisons if projections are accurate regarding shrinking state and local
economies. Cash-strapped state governments do not typically increase
corrections staff salaries or invest in improving prison conditions to make
them safer workplaces, which are the two greatest barriers to successful
staff hiring and retention.9 Many corrections staff positions are dangerous
with low pay,10 sometimes below the federal poverty line,11 and many are
filled by people who are statistically vulnerable to climate-related labor
market dislocations.12 If climate change makes staffing prisons harder than
it already is — and in some of the United States’s most dangerous prisons,
50% staff vacancy rates are not uncommon — prison residents will suffer
harm.13
Prison understaffing causes systems-level breakdowns of core facility
operations.14 These operations include delivery of medical and mental

9. See Mary Ellen Klas, Florida Prisons Can’t Go on Like This, New Chief Says,
TAMPA
BAY
TIMES
(Dec.
1,
2019),
https://www.tampabay.com/floridapolitics/buzz/2019/12/01/florida-prisons-cant-go-on-like-this-new-chief-says/
[https://perma.cc/NBP4-DSWX] (explaining that for eight years, since 2011, the Florida
Legislature has been extracting money from the prison system and shifted staff from an
eight-hour shift to a 12-hour shift which resulted in an 150% increase in officer turnover).
10. See Joseph Neff & Alysia Santo, What Happened When No One Wanted Dangerous,
Low-Paying Guard Jobs? Wilkinson County Prison Put Gangs in Charge, MISS. TODAY
(June
26, 2019), https://mississippitoday.org/2019/06/26/what-happened-when-no-onewanted-dangerous-low-paying-guard-jobs-wilkinson-county-prison-put-gangs-in-charge/
[https://perma.cc/C5V8-D3G3].
11. See, e.g., Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 84 Fed. Reg. 1167–68
(Feb. 1, 2019) (providing the federal poverty line for a family of four, which is higher than
the $24,900 entry level salary of a Mississippi correctional officer); Occupational
Employment and Wages, May 2020, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://
www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes333012.htm [https://perma.cc/H4SJ-JP36] (last visited Mar. 31,
2021); Low Pay Contributes to Staffing Problems at Mississippi Prisons, WLOX (Aug. 22,
2019, 9:47 PM), https://www.wlox.com/2019/08/23/low-pay-contributes-staffing-problemsmississippi-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/MCD3-2TNB].
12. See, e.g., ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ & KAREN AKERLOF, YALE PROJECT ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, RACE, ETHNICITY AND PUBLIC RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2010),
https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/2010_04_RaceEthnicity-and-Public-Responses-to-Climate-Change.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HAS-3FL6].
13. See, e.g., Jerry Mitchell, Violent, Ongoing Hell: Mississippi Prisons May Be Worse
than Alabama’s. Will DOJ Step In?, CLARION LEDGER (Aug. 21, 2019, 8:11
AM), https://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2019/08/21/mississippi-prisons-conditionsworse-than-alabama-doj-violence-cruel-unusual-punishment/2055478001/
[https://perma.cc/XD5C-V3VP]; SMCI Staffing Crisis Prompts Lockdown and Visitation
Cancellation, MISS. DEP’T CORR. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.mdoc.ms.gov/Pages/SMCIStaffing-Crisis-Prompts-Lockdown-and-Visitation-Cancellation-.aspx
[https://perma.cc/86ME-G46A].
14. See, e.g., Expert Report of Eldon Vail at 4, Dockery v. Hall, No. 3:13-cv-326, ECF
No. 801-1 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 16, 2018). Eldon Vail, the former commissioner of the
Washington Department of Corrections, analyzed a Mississippi prison’s staffing patterns
and testified about how systemic understaffing created dangerous and unconstitutional
conditions. See id.
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healthcare, provision of food and water, execution of suicide prevention
protocols, and monitoring and intervention as required for resident safety
and facility security. If there are not enough staff to open and close doors,
watch and call for help, or escort providers or residents to appointments, a
cascade of basic needs goes unmet: ambulances do not get called, medical
and psychiatric appointments are missed, medication and meals are
skipped, and fires burn unchecked.15
Understaffing also causes increased violence and prolonged lockdowns,
which makes entire prisons function like long-term segregation and solitary
confinement units. Extended lockdowns due to understaffing may violate
the federal rights of people in prison, particularly when restrictions and
deprivations amount to conditions of long-term segregation or solitary
confinement.16 Subjecting people in prison to prolonged periods of de jure
or de facto solitary confinement creates a known and substantial risk of
serious psychological harm that courts have recognized as constitutionally
cognizable, finding that conditions of solitary confinement can violate the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 17

15. See, e.g., Jerry Mitchell, Ticking Time Bomb: Violence Surges Among Guard
Shortage, Lockdown at Mississippi Prison, USA TODAY (Aug. 20, 2019, 8:34 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2019/08/19/prison-violence-surgesmississippi-prison-amid-guard-shortage/2054554001/
[https://perma.cc/K7EN-MFDT];
SMCI Staffing Crisis Prompts Lockdown and Visitation Cancellation, supra note 13
(providing that near-capacity prison populations and extreme staff vacancy rates had created
a “staffing crisis,” which threatened a “pressure cooker type situation” in Mississippi
Department of Corrections’s three state-run prisons (quoting the former Commissioner of
the Mississippi Department of Corrections)).
16. See, e.g., Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 2013) (alleging prisoner
residents stated an Eighth Amendment claim involving “a pattern of prison-wide lockdowns,
which . . . occurred for flimsy reasons or no reason at all”).
17. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995) (liberty interest may exist
where regulations provide for “freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”
(citations omitted)); Palokovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 226 (3d Cir. 2017); Wilkerson v.
Goodwin, 774 F.3d 845, 848–49 (5th Cir. 2014) (liberty interest implicated by extended
placement in solitary confinement for 23 hours per day without full exercise privileges or
human contact); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1133 (9th Cir. 2000) (six-and-a-half-week
denial of outdoor recreation could constitute Eighth Amendment violation); Porter v.
Clarke, 290 F. Supp. 3d 518, 529, 532 (E.D. Va. 2018) (citing “rapidly evolving information
available about the potential harmful effects of solitary confinement” in holding Virginia
Department of Corrections’ practices unconstitutional); Order at 299, Braggs v. Dunn, No.
2:14CV601-MHT(WO) (M.D. Ala. June 27, 2017) (regarding Alabama Department of
Corrections’ solitary confinement practices regarding mentally ill prisoners violate the
Eighth Amendment); Ind. Protection & Advoc. Servs. Comm’n v. Comm’r, No. 1:08-CV01317, 2012 WL 6738517 (S.D. Ind. Dec. 31, 2012); Norwood v. Woodford, 661 F. Supp.
2d 1148, 1155–56 (S.D. Cal. 2009) (five-week denial of outdoor recreation could constitute
Eighth Amendment violation); Jones ‘El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1122–23 (W.D.
Wis. 2001).
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For prison residents who experience trauma as a result of exposure to
chronic violence and isolation, the effects on them and their home
communities will extend across both urban and rural spaces as a
disproportionate share of U.S. prison residents are from urban areas and a
disproportionate share of prisons and prisoners are located in rural areas.18
B. Deadlier Facilities
Prisons are already prone to flooding, vulnerable to fire, and capable of
staying hot, cold, or wet enough to cause residents harm. Facility-related
hazards caused by climate-related stress will become more dangerous and
disruptive as the frequency and amplitude of extreme weather increase.19
These dangers include failures at the physical plant level, such as brownouts,20 black-outs, and burst water pipes or gas lines; increased incidents of
death, injury, or illness caused by exposure; and institutional unrest or
interpersonal violence triggered by the pain and stress of living in
environmentally dangerous conditions.21
As the climate changes, “food and water supplies will be put at risk” and
“[p]eak energy use during heat waves will likely cause more frequent
brownouts and blackouts.”22 We will likely see increasingly powerful

18. See Porter et al., supra note 3. The harms referenced may present as persistent
injury, work-prohibitive disability, or loss of invaluable familial or intergenerational
relationships and supportive resources.
19. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION PLAN 2-1, 2-2 (2014), https://www.cakex.org/sites/default/files/documents/dojclimate-change-adaptation-plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/3AQ9-29RM] (determining that the
highest-risk areas were “buildings, utilities infrastructure . . . , and personnel” (emphasis
removed)).
20. See Brownout, MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/brownout [https://perma.cc/BQQ6-GRKJ] (last visited Jan. 8, 2022)
(providing that a brown-out is “a period of reduced voltage of electricity caused especially
by high demand and resulting in reduced illumination” in or restriction in the availability of
electrical power in a particular area).
21. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 19, at 2-6, B-3 (providing that the Bureau
of Prisons must “ensure that prisons continue to function in the case of energy disruption,
heat waves, drought, or coastal storm impacts,” and plan for “[d]isruption of operations
resulting from potential unrest (and increased violence) among populations affected by
severe weather, extreme heat, and drought” (emphasis removed)).
22. DANIEL W. E. HOLT, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L., COLUMBIA L. SCH., HEAT
IN US PRISONS AND JAILS: CORRECTIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 6 (2015),
https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/holt__heat_in_us_prisons_and_jails.pdf [https://perma.cc/VU4S-64AQ] (“As temperatures rise
and the climate changes, food and water supplies will be put at risk. Peak energy use during
heat waves will likely cause more frequent brownouts and blackouts. Buildings, paved
surfaces, and mechanical systems are all vulnerable to damage from high heat. And these
and other impacts will be compounded by other effects of climate change, such as
flooding.”).
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hurricanes, rising sea levels, and floods that will compromise electrical
infrastructure. The effects of climate change can have dangerous health
consequences, from extreme heat that causes heat stroke and heat-related
illness and death, to extreme cold that causes hypothermia and death, and
to wildfires that create the risk of severe smoke inhalation for prison and
jail residents and staff.23
Some extreme environmental prison conditions already seasonally cause
injury or death; some have been held to be cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the constitutional rights of residents. Below are a few
examples of dangerous facility conditions that are created or exacerbated
by climate-change-related conditions and a brief discussion of likely
longer-term consequences to prison residents and their home communities.
Flooding. During Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the Orleans Parish Prison
was flooded with hundreds of detained individuals trapped inside.24 People
were locked inside cells as they flooded, jail staff fled, and people locked
within spent days without food, water, or power — some were trapped up
to their chests or necks in sewage-contaminated water.25 The jail had a
contingency plan — that their backup generators could remain operational
— but some of the generators failed because they were not physically
placed above the 100-year flood levels. The entire jail went dark during
and after the hurricane.26 The flooding destroyed the jail’s electrical
systems.27 Other generators failed due to staff’s inability to operate them
or because fuel ran out.28 The lack of power made it impossible to open

23. See generally id.
24. See Prison Conditions and Prisoner Abuse After Katrina, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/prison-conditions-and-prisoner-abuse-after-katrina
[https://perma.cc/4GWY-J8YM] (last visited Nov. 5, 2021).
25. See, e.g., NAT’L PRISON PROJECT, ACLU, ABANDONED & ABUSED: ORLEANS PARISH
PRISONERS
IN
THE
WAKE
OF
HURRICANE
KATRINA
17
(2006),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/oppreport20060809.pdf
[https://perma.cc/77DR-MQ9M].
26. In the days prior to Hurricane Katrina, the sheriff of the Orleans Parish Prison (OPP)
refused to evacuate the jail residents, despite that New Orleans’ mayor declared a mandatory
city-wide evacuation. Notably, as the hurricane approached, OPP continued to accept new
detainees, including children under 18 years of age (juvenile detainees), into the jail during
this time from other facilities. When the storm hit and floodwaters entered the facility, many
sheriff’s deputies fled their posts leaving people locked inside cells, with no means of
getting out or of getting help — some trapped for days without food, clean water, or
ventilation, some in cells where floodwaters reached chest height. Days passed before the
jail was evacuated by order of the state, and the rescued residents were transferred to other
facilities across the state of Louisiana. At the time, OPP sheriff’s deputies were not aware of
any evacuation plan and had no training in how to respond to an emergency. See id. at 26.
27. See id. at 24.
28. See id. at 26.
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certain cell doors and, in several jail buildings, detained individuals were
left trapped in flooded cells without ventilation.29
Extreme Temperatures and Fire. In 2021, the winter’s deep freeze
damaged lines conveying water, gas, and electricity to prisons in
Mississippi.30 In 2020, the state of Oregon ordered a delayed and crash
evacuation of Coffee Creek Correctional Facility while wildfires raged.31
For decades, long before the extreme temperatures associated with climate
change were common, people imprisoned in extremely hot facilities or
restrainted in hot prison yards without the ability to cool down were
bringing and winning cases alleging that such conditions amount to cruel
and unusual punishment.32 More than a dozen individuals in Texas prisons
have recently died of heat stroke and as many individuals have brought
excessive heat suits.33 Louisianans in prison have long litigated heat
cases.34 In Mississippi, plaintiff prison residents successfully challenged
the constitutionality of the excessive heat in the now-closed death row unit
at Mississippi State Penitentiary at Parchman.35 The Fifth Circuit found
that the heat, humidity, and the presence of mosquitos in cells during the
Mississippi summers constituted cruel and unusual punishment in locations

29. See id.
30. See Frigid Temps Cause Some Problems in Mississippi Prisons, JACKSON FREE
PRESS
(Feb.
18,
2021,
11:56
AM),
https://www.jacksonfreepress.
com/news/2021/feb/18/frigid-temps-cause-some-problems-mississippi-priso/
[https://perma.cc/KP5B-FLP7].
31. See Whitney Woodworth, 1,303 Inmates Evacuated from Coffee Creek Prison Due
to Wildfires, SALEM STATESMAN J. (Sep. 10, 2020, 6:21 PM), https://www.
statesmanjournal.com/story/news/2020/09/10/oregon-wildfires-inmates-evacuated-coffeecreek-prison-santiam-riverside/3463532001/ [https://perma.cc/K9KC-3ERS].
32. See Brock v. Warren Cnty., 713 F. Supp. 238, 243 (E.D. Tenn. 1989) (finding that
the jail could be held liable for damages for an incarcerate person dying of heat prostration
when the jail officials “made no effort to rectify the excessive heat and lack of ventilation
problem in the jail” when they knew that the conditions existed and represented a “serious
health problems in inmates”); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (finding
“obvious” Eighth Amendment violations for the use of the hitching post in Alabama prisons
and providing that the most common complaint from victims of the hitching post was
“unnecessary exposure to the heat of the sun”).
33. See Blackmon v. Garza, 484 F. App’x 866, 867 (5th Cir. 2012); see also Hinojosa v.
Livingston, 807 F.3d 657, 666 (5th Cir. 2015) (referencing that between 2007 and 2012, 13
people died in Texas state prisons from heat-related causes).
34. See, e.g., Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 596 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding that housing
death row residents in very hot cells without access to heat-relief measures while knowing
that each suffers from medical conditions which render them “extremely vulnerable to
serious heat-related injury” violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
35. See Gates v. Cook, 376 F.3d 323, 340 (5th Cir. 2004).
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without air conditioning where it was dangerous to keep windows open due
to endemic mosquito-borne West Nile virus.36
Academics, medical professionals, and law enforcement professionals
have developed what some refer to as the “heat hypothesis.”37 The
hypothesis posits that hot temperatures can cause increased incidents of
aggressive behaviors and violence.38 In 2001, researchers suggested that
this increased frequency of violence associated with excessive heat should
be characterized as a negative social consequence of global warming, and
that schools, prisons, and a variety of workplaces should prepare for
increased violence and develop interventions accordingly.39 In general,
crime rates rise during the warmer summer months.40 A team of
economists studying the impact of climate change at a county level across
all geographic regions of the country predicted that — as a consequence of
rising temperatures — northern regions of the country will experience an
increase in the frequency of property crimes because property crime rates
are at their lowest when it is cold outside.41
During summers in Louisiana’s solitary confinement units, high
temperatures frequently interfere with the delivery of mental health
services and are blamed for higher rates of self-harm. 42 The Vera Institute
of Justice found that the average number of self-harm incidents were
significantly higher when the average heat index was above 100 degrees,
mainly in June, July, and August.43 Temperatures inside segregated and

36. See id. at 334. This and other litigation also raises the issue that living in excessively
hot places can be especially dangerous for people who must take medications that interfere
with one’s ability to effectively maintain and regulate one’s body temperature.
37. See Craig A. Anderson, Heat and Violence, 10 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCH. SCI.
33, 33 (2001).
38. See id.
39. See id. at 37 (suggesting that schools, prisons, and workplaces are good targets for
heat-related intervention and the research on better climate control show that the additional
costs for climate control are outweighed by the benefits of better learning, lower costs, less
property damage, and increased productivity).
40. See JANET L. LAURITSEN & NICOLE WHITE, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., SEASONAL
PATTERNS
IN
CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION
TRENDS
1
(2014),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/spcvt.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6CC-T9KR].
41. See SOLOMON HSIANG ET AL., ESTIMATING ECONOMIC DAMAGE FROM CLIMATE
CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES, 356 SCI. 1362, 1364 fig.2G (2017) (predicting that property
crime increases as the amount of cold days decrease, and the Northern American regions
will lose cold days due to climate change).
42. See, e.g., DAVID CLOUD ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., THE SAFE ALTERNATIVES TO
SEGREGATION INITIATIVE: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE LOUISIANA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND CORRECTIONS, AND PROGRESS TOWARD
IMPLEMENTATION 39–40 (2019), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/safealternatives-segregation-initiative-findings-recommendations-ldps.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y6CT-UBNX].
43. See id. at 41 fig.11.
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death row cells in Louisiana state prisons sometimes exceed 100 degrees.44
Mental healthcare providers have attributed the increasing frequency of
self-harming behavior during hot summer months to prison residents’
physical discomfort, heat-related psychological deterioration, and desires to
get out of their overly hot cells.45
Less money for facility maintenance, repairs, and replacement. Climate
change is expected to shrink gross domestic product (GDP) and cause
substantial economic damage to local and state governments, particularly in
the Southeast,46 which is home to a number of facilities with chronically
inadequate or already failing prison and jail facilities.47 Economists
anticipate that the poorest 30% of all counties in the United States will lose
between 2% and 20% of their income as a result of the progression of
climate change during the twenty-first century.48
The predicted concentration of economic damage due to climate change
within the Southern states and the Gulf Coast has been widely reported. In
2020, ProPublica and The New York Times Magazine, with other authors,
analyzed climate change data and research from the Rhodium Group and
other sources. They generated a number of projections and a series of

44. See Ball v. LeBlanc, 988 F. Supp. 2d 639, 664 (M.D. La. 2013), aff’d in part,
vacated in part, 792 F.3d 585 (5th Cir. 2015) (stating that “uncontroverted” data
“established that inmates housed in each of the death row tiers were frequently subjected to
heat indices above 100 degrees”).
45. See CLOUD ET AL., supra note 42, at 40.
46. See Brad Plumer & Nadja Popovich, As Climate Changes, Southern States Will
Suffer
More
than
Others,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
29,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/29/climate/southern-states-worse-climateeffects.html [https://perma.cc/C5XH-8G4P] (observing that with each increasing degree rise
in global temperature the United States can face losses in GDP and the worst-hit counties
are projected to be in the southeast United States).
47. See, e.g., Lewis v. Cain, No. 15-cv-318, 2021 WL 1219988, at *14, *47 (M.D. La.
Mar. 31, 2021) (finding the medical care at Louisiana State Prison in Angola violates
residents’ federal rights on a number of grounds, including due to physical plant
inadequacies); Cole v. Livingston, No. 14-CV-1698, 2016 WL 3406439, at *2 (S.D. Tex.
June 21, 2016), vacated sub nom., Yates v. Collier, 677 F. App’x. 915 (5th Cir. Jan. 30,
2017) (noting the dangers of having Texas prison residents drink water containing between
two and four-and-a-half times the levels of arsenic permitted by the United States EPA in
order to cope with the chronic extreme heat); Complaint at 6, Amos v. Hall, No. 20-CV00007 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 14, 2020) (alleging a range of infrastructure failures at Mississippi’s
oldest, plantation-style prison, including exposure to raw sewage, contaminated food and
water, and widespread rat and mice infestations).
48. See e.g., Robinson Meyer, The American South Will Bear the Worst of Climate
Change’s
Costs,
ATLANTIC
(June
29,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.
com/science/archive/2017/06/global-warming-american-south/532200/
[https://perma.cc/8P99-XSLQ]; Pam Wright, Southern U.S., Poor Counties Will Take the
Biggest Hit from Climate Change, WEATHER CHANNEL (July 1, 2017),
https://weather.com/science/environment/news/climate-change-southern-states-counties
[https://perma.cc/BG6L-UUE5].
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graphics (ProPublica Maps) illustrating those projections, which depict the
predicted consequences of selected climate-related impacts under
conditions of continued moderate and high emissions.49 Two ProPublica
Maps in particular show concentrated economic damage in the U.S. South
and the Gulf Coast. In “Economic Damages from Climate: 2040–2060,”50
the authors explain that “[r]ising energy costs, lower labor productivity,
poor crop yields and increasing crime are among the climate-driven
elements that will increasingly drag on the U.S. economy, eventually taking
a financial toll that exceeds that from the COVID-19 pandemic in some
regions.”51 In “Farm Crop Yields: 2040–2060,”52 the authors explain,
“[w]ith rising temperatures, it will become more difficult to grow food,”
and parts of Texas “may see yields drop by more than 70%.”53 Such severe
economic loss attributable to climate change is likely to make less money
available for prison and jail facility maintenance, repairs, and replacement,
with potentially harmful results in already substandard facilities.
Prison and jail residents in the United States are more vulnerable to
being harmed if exposed to environmental stressors. People with
underlying health conditions are disproportionately represented in the U.S.
prison population.54 Forty percent of those incarcerated in state and federal
prisons and local jails report having a current chronic medical condition,
and approximately 50% report that they currently have or previously had a
chronic medical condition.55 Prison residents are also more likely than the
U.S. general population to report having a chronic condition or infectious
disease.56

49. Al Shaw, Abrahm Lustgarten & Jeremy W. Goldsmith, New Climate Maps Show a
Transformed
United
States,
PROPUBLICA
(Sept.
15,
2020),
https://projects.propublica.org/climate-migration/
[https://perma.cc/CH8D-6WV4].
A
number of these graphics are reproduced in the Appendixes with permission of the
copyright owner.
50. See app. A, fig.1.
51. See Shaw et al., supra note 49.
52. See app. B, fig.2.
53. See Shaw et al., supra note 49.
54. See e.g., LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, MARCUS BERZOFSKY & JENNIFER UNANGST,
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., NCJ 248491, MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF STATE AND FEDERAL
PRISONERS
AND
JAIL
INMATES,
2011–12
1
(2015),
https://bjs.ojp.gov
/content/pub/pdf/mpsfpji1112.pdf [https://perma.cc/L57K-ZMTW] (finding that comparing
the incarcerated population of the United States to the general, free U.S. population, that
incarcerated people are more likely to “report ever having a chronic condition or infectious
disease”); Julia Vitale, A Look at the United States’ Aging Prison Population Problem,
INTERROGATING JUST. (Apr. 7, 2021), https://interrogatingjustice.org/ending-massincarceration/aging-prison-population/ [https://perma.cc/SLU8-S3MA].
55. See MARUSCHAK ET AL., supra note 54.
56. See, e.g., id.
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The U.S. prison population is also aging. The percentage of people who
are 55 or older has been growing consistently, accounting for over 10% of
the U.S. prison population in 2016.57 In state prison systems, people age 55
and older now outnumber the population of young adults between the ages
of 18 and 24.58
People living in state and federal prisons and local jails suffer from a
range of chronic medical conditions, including cancer, high blood pressure,
stroke, diabetes, heart and cardiovascular related problems, kidney
problems, arthritis, asthma, and liver cirrhosis.59 Overweightness and
obesity are common in incarcerated persons, and obesity is a pre-existing
condition that can cause dangerous complications related to heat-related
illness.60 The most common chronic condition for prison residents is high
blood pressure, and taking high blood pressure medications increases the
likelihood that one will suffer from heat-related illnesses if exposed.61
In sum, the higher frequency of pre-existing conditions and medical
vulnerabilities within prison resident populations makes it more likely that
people within that group will face more serious and long-lasting
consequences as a result of additional climate change-related harms.
Corrections officials have a duty to prison residents under the U.S.
Constitution to maintain reasonably safe facilities — they cannot simply
“await a tragic event.”62 The federal government has taken initial steps
towards recognizing the risks posed by climate change to people held in
correctional settings.
In 2014, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
promulgated an updated safety manual regarding climate related safety
protocols.63 The DOJ determined that the most serious threats from climate
change that its prisons faced were related to severe weather, flooding,
drought, high temperatures, and rising sea levels.64 It also identified related
risks to human health, including risks due to excessive heat, inability to

57. See, e.g., Weihua Li & Nicole Lewis, This Chart Shows Why the Prison Population
Is So Vulnerable to COVID-19, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 19, 2020, 2:45 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/03/19/this-chart-shows-why-the-prisonpopulation-is-so-vulnerable-to-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/2LZG-SC9H].
58. See id.
59. See, e.g., MARUSCHAK ET AL., supra note 54, at 1.
60. See id.
61. See, e.g., HOLT, supra note 22, at ii, 24 (analyzing data from health surveys of
incarcerated populations and explaining that hypertension, obesity, and asthma are
commonplace amongst U.S. prison populations, and that many of the medications prison
residents are prescribed to treat these conditions compromise their body's ability to handle
heat).
62. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993) (providing that “Courts of Appeals
have plainly recognized that a remedy for unsafe conditions need not await a tragic event”).
63. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 19, at ii.
64. See id. at 2-2.
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maintain hygienic conditions of confinement, and increased unrest and
violence amongst imprisoned people as a result of environmentally
stressful effects of climate change.65 The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) was
directed to address human health and safety concerns relating to extreme
weather events66 and to be prepared for climate change-related energy
source disruptions due to excessive heat or cold, drought, and storms and
hurricanes likely to compromise the structural integrity of their buildings.67
Consequences to home communities. Finally, unnecessarily exposing
prison residents to more dangerous conditions as a result of climate change
will hurt their home communities. Formerly incarcerated individuals’
home communities are more likely to be poorer than others and have fewer
employment opportunities.68 About 49% of formerly incarcerated people
earn less than $500 as reported on W2s or tax returns, and 32% earn
between $500 to $15,000 annually; only 20% of formerly incarcerated
people earn more than $15,000 a year after their return home from prison.69
These already low annual earnings — combined with anticipated economic
damage due to climate change — make it more likely that climate change
will both exacerbate poverty in the communities prison residents return to
and make it less likely that incarcerated residents harmed by climaterelated dangers get the support and care they need when they come home.70
It is already particularly difficult for returning citizens to obtain the

65. See id. at 2-2, 2-6, B-3 (providing that the Bureau of Prisons must “ensure that
prisons continue to function in the case of energy disruption, heat waves, drought, or coastal
storm impacts,” and plan for “[d]isruption of operations resulting from potential unrest (and
increased violence) among populations affected by severe weather, extreme heat, and
drought”).
66. See id. at 2-4.
67. See id. at 2-6.
68. See, e.g., ADAM LOONEY & NICHOLAS TURNER, BROOKINGS INST., WORK AND
OPPORTUNITY BEFORE AND AFTER INCARCERATION
2, 7
fig.1
(2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/es_20180314_
looneyincarceration_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/8KTL-BEWF] (explaining that individuals
who are incarcerated are much more likely to come from the poorest communities, and that
“the incarcerated fare poorly in the formal labor market after they are released”).
69. See id. at 7.
70. See Sarah Figgatt, Reentry Reforms Are More Critical than Ever amid the
Coronavirus Pandemic, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 30, 2020, 9:03 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/news/2020/04/30/484168/reentryreforms-critical-ever-amid-coronavirus-pandemic/
[https://perma.cc/93MH-WPC6]
(explaining the need for reentry reforms and expanded support for returning citizens,
especially following a natural disaster or public health emergency such as the COVID-19
pandemic: returning citizens may experience chronic unemployment, homelessness, and be
unable to afford healthcare; by not providing local resources reentry support, a government
“merely transitions formerly incarcerated people from one harmful environment to another,
jeopardizing both their and their communities’ health, safety, and security”).
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healthcare they need.71 Moreover, jobs that provide health insurance are
more difficult to obtain with a felony record, and insurance premiums for
people with pre-existing injuries are often higher and more burdensome for
returning citizens and their families to pay.72
C. Racial Disparities
Babies born today to parents of color, or into poorer families, already
face a higher risk of incarceration.73 Climate change will hit poor families
the hardest,74 and, because of the effects of past and present systemic racial
discrimination, that burden on the poor will disproportionately fall on
people of color. Poor people of color are already at greater risk of being
unnecessarily incarcerated due to racial disparities in policing, prosecution,
and plea deals.75 With the additional downward economic and social

71. See KAMALA MALLIK-KANE, ELLEN PADDOCK & JESSE JANNETTA, NAT’L INST. OF
CORR. & DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., HEALTH CARE AFTER INCARCERATION (2018),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/96386/
health_care_after_incarceration.pdf [https://perma.cc/FH6A-NHFL] (surveying a group of
formerly incarcerated people shortly after coming home who had applied for healthcare
insurance and ran into issues with coverage and difficulties accessing and scheduling).
72. See, e.g., id. (explaining that “most people returning from prison lacked health
insurance, impeding receipt of care for chronic health conditions and leading to high levels
of emergency room use”).
73. See, e.g., LOONEY & TURNER, supra note 68, at 2, 12 (finding that (1) “boys from the
poorest families are 40 times more likely to end up in prison compared to boys from the
richest families”; (2) “there are more men in prison from the bottom 1 percent than from the
top 15 percent of the income distribution”; and (3) “individuals incarcerated in their early
30s are much more likely to have grown up in poverty, in single parent families, and in
neighborhoods of concentrated economic distress and with large minority populations”).
74. See, e.g., S. Nazrul Islam & John Winkel, Climate Change and Social Inequality 2,
4 (United Nations Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Aff., Working Paper No. 152, 2017),
https://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2017/wp152_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G3N-WTPR]
(providing that climate change is expected to increase poverty disproportionately among the
already-poor, and explaining a three-step cycle: (1) “inequality increases the exposure of the
disadvantaged social groups to the ‘adverse effects of climate change’ (‘climate hazards,’
for short)”; (2) “given the exposure level, inequality increases the disadvantaged groups’
susceptibility to damages caused by climate hazards”; and (3) “inequality decreases these
groups’ relative ability to cope with and recover from the damages they suffer”).
75. See, e.g., THE SENT’G PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM
5
(2016)
[hereinafter
SENT’G
PROJECT
2016],
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Reducing-Racial-Disparityin-the-Criminal-Justice-System-A-Manual-for-Practitioners-and-Policymakers.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M884-SA7Q] (noting the impact that race and class have on the likelihood
of criminal legal system involvement, and that “low-income individuals are generally
overrepresented at every stage of the criminal justice system, and [that] it is widely
acknowledged that people of color are disproportionately low-income”).
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pressures projected to accompany climate change, it is expected that the
trend of increasing racial disparities in incarceration will worsen.76
At all stages of the U.S. criminal legal system, poor people, Black,
Brown, and Native people are overrepresented.77 Within the U.S. prison
population (state and federal prisons), people in prison are mostly poor or
working class, and disproportionately Black and Brown.78 Black and
Hispanic79 people together constitute 29% of the U.S. general population,
but 57% of the U.S. prison population.80 The national imprisonment rates
for Black and Hispanic people are nearly 5 times and 1.3 times the rate for
white adults, respectively, with even higher relative rates in certain states.81
In 12 states, more than half the prison population is Black, even though
there are no states in the country that have a majority Black population.82
Almost half, 48.3%, of people sentenced to life imprisonment or “virtual”

76. See, e.g., Islam & Winkel, supra note 74, at 2 (“[T]he relationship between climate
change and social inequality is characterized by a vicious cycle, whereby initial inequality
makes disadvantaged groups suffer disproportionately from the adverse effects of climate
change, resulting in greater subsequent inequality.”).
77. See, e.g., THE SENT’G PROJECT, REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ON RACIAL
DISPARITIES IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2018) [hereinafter SENT’G PROJECT
2018],
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/un-report-on-racial-disparities/
[https://perma.cc/3B9P-ZGKJ] (noting that there is “racial disparity that permeates every
stage of the United States criminal justice system, from arrest to trial to sentencing to post
prison experiences”).
78. See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., PRISONERS IN 2018 (2020),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/p18.pdf [https://perma.cc/NXQ2-Z3DU] (showing that
the rate of imprisonment for Black and Hispanic people is higher than the national average,
and the national average is higher than the rate of imprisonment for white people).
79. The Authors considered recent polling of the Hispanic or Latino population in the
U.S. by the Pew Research Center, as well as personal experience, in using the terms “U.S.
Hispanics” or “Hispanics” to refer to the U.S. population of people tracing their roots to
Mexico, Latin America, and Spain; the Authors acknowledge that no single term is
adequate, and that terminology is evolving. See e.g., Luis Noe-Bustamante, Lauren Mora &
Mark Hugo Lopez, About One-in-Four U.S. Hispanics Have Heard of Latinx, but Just 3%
Use
It,
PEW
RSRH.
CTR.
(Aug.
11,
2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2020/08/11/about-one-in-four-u-s-hispanics-haveheard-of-latinx-but-just-3-use-it/ [https://perma.cc/466E-UXXT] (finding that the majority
(61%) of U.S. Hispanics say they prefer Hispanic to describe the Hispanic or Latino
population in the United States; 29% say they prefer Latino; 4% say they prefer Latinx).
80. See SENT’G PROJECT 2018, supra note 77.
81. See ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENT’G PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS (2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/
publications/color-of-justice-racial-and-ethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons/
[https://perma.cc/KW4Q-ZSUC] (showing that in Minnesota, New Jersey, Vermont, and
Wisconsin, the disparity of Black incarceration to white is a rate of more than ten to one).
82. See id.
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life sentences — where sentences are so long that people will die
imprisoned — are Black.83
Structural racism in policing, charging, prosecution, plea deals, and at
other critical stages of the criminal legal system have created a system
where Black, Brown, and Native people are overrepresented in the nation’s
prisons and jails.84
However, people living in poverty are also
overrepresented in the system, and being born a person of color into a poor
family compounds the already high risk of incarceration.85 Young men
from the poorest families in the country are 40 times more likely to end up
in prison compared to young men from the richest families.86 People who
are incarcerated are significantly more likely to have grown up
impoverished, in single-income families, and in neighborhoods with
concentrated poverty and large populations of people of color.87

83. See e.g., ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENT’G PROJECT, STILL LIFE: AMERICA’S INCREASING
USE OF LIFE AND LONG-TERM SENTENCES 5, https://www.sentencingproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/Still-Life.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KFJ-AA8E] (last visited Jan. 11,
2022) (noting that almost half of all people sentenced to life are Black, giving a rate of one
out of every five Black prison residents has a life sentence and in the states of Alabama,
Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, and South Carolina two thirds or more
of everyone with a life sentence is Black).
84. See Radley Balko, There’s Overwhelming Evidence That the Criminal Justice
System Is Racist. Here’s the Proof., WASH. POST (June 10, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/opinions/systemic-racism-police-evidencecriminal-justice-system/ [https://perma.cc/69Y4-SAA3]; see also NELLIS, supra note 83, at
5; Leah Wong, The U.S. Criminal Justice System Disproportionately Hurts Native People:
The
Data,
Visualized,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(Oct.
8,
2021),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2021/10/08/indigenouspeoplesday/
[https://perma.cc/94V9-WRPA] (“The latest incarceration data, however, shows that
American Indian and Alaska Native people have high rates of incarceration in both jails and
prisons as compared with other racial and ethnic groups. In jails, Native people had more
than double the incarceration rate of white people, and in prisons this disparity was even
greater.”).
85. See, e.g., SENT’G PROJECT 2016, supra note 75, at 5 (noting that issues of race and
class have an impact on the likelihood of involvement within the criminal justice system and
that “low-income individuals are generally overrepresented at every stage of the criminal
justice system, and [that] it is widely acknowledged that people of color are
disproportionately low-income”).
86. See, e.g., LOONEY & TURNER, supra note 68, at 12 (finding that (1) “boys from the
poorest families are 40 times more likely to end up in prison compared to boys from the
richest families” and (2) “there are more men in prison from the bottom 1 percent than from
the top 15 percent of the income distribution”).
87. See id. (“[I]ndividuals incarcerated in their early 30s are much more likely to have
grown up in poverty, in single parent families, and in neighborhoods of concentrated
economic distress and with large minority populations.”).
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i. Examples of Racial Disparities in Imprisonment
Racial disparities: The victims at Orleans Parish Prison during
Hurricane Katrina. The flooding and abandonment of the Orleans Parish
Prison, and the people locked inside, during Hurricane Katrina are
disturbing examples of how the disparate treatment of people of color in
the U.S. criminal legal system makes them more likely to be harmed by
dangerous facility conditions that are attributable to climate change. In
New Orleans, prior to Katrina, only 66.6% of the parish was Black, yet the
Orleans Parish Prison population at the time of the hurricane was almost
90% Black.88 The Orleans Parish Prison also held children in its juvenile
unit, some as young as ten years old, and the population of children held in
Orleans Parish Prison was over 95% Black.89 Most individuals held at
Orleans Parish Prison when Hurricane Katrina hit were non-violent pretrial detainees.90 This means that most were being held simply because
they could not afford to post bail, and that they were presumed innocent of
the charges on which they were being held (including attachments, traffic
violations, and municipal charges).91 Such charges included parking
violations, public drunkenness, and failure to pay a fine.92 The individuals
deetained were overwhelmingly — and disproportionately — poor Black
people, who on account of structural racism were vastly overrepresented
among those trapped in an abandoned, unsafe jail for days during one of
the largest and most deadly weather events in U.S. history.93
Racial disparities: Imprisonment in Alabama. In 2016, the DOJ
launched an investigation into Alabama men’s prisons for suspected
violations of federal and constitutional law, and after 20 months of failed
negotiations, the DOJ sued.94 The DOJ suit claimed that the Alabama
Department of Corrections is failing to protect prison residents from

88. See NAT’L PRISON PROJECT, supra note 25, at 17.
89. See id. at 29.
90. See id. at 13.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 29 (explaining that Orleans Parish Prison’s “population at the time of the
storm was almost entirely African-American,” and “[m]ore than 300” of the incarcerated
people in the jail during the Hurricane “had been arrested and booked between August 26–
28, when the City of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana were under states of
emergency” showing that even Hurricane Katrina could not stop the criminal legal system in
New Orleans at the time from targeting and confining poor Black people).
94. See, e.g., ALABAMA’S STATE PRISONS INVESTIGATION, supra note 8, at 3 (“[T]he
Department opened a CRIPA investigation into the conditions in ADOC facilities housing
male prisoners.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Justice Department Files Lawsuit
Against the State of Alabama for Unconstitutional Conditions in State’s Prisons for Men
(Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-files-lawsuit-againststate-alabama-unconstitutional-conditions-states [https://perma.cc/XR5K-BDYP].
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violence at the hands of staff and residents, failing to protect them from
sexual violence, and failing to provide sanitary and safe conditions in
violation of the constitutional and federal rights of prison residents.95
The range of harms described by the DOJ — unnecessary injuries,
trauma, and death resulting from harmful prison conditions — fall
disproportionately on people of color. For example, the homicide rate for
Black men in Alabama prisons is three times the rate for white men.96
From 2014 to 2020, 77% of Alabama prison homicides were of Black
men.97 Black people in Alabama prisons are also disproportionately
represented within the death statistics, not just from homicides within the
prisons,98 and, because Black people are overrepresented, they are more
likely to be among those infected by COVID-19 in the Alabama prisons
system.99
ii. Racial Disparities in Imprisonment Due to Poverty Resulting from
Structural and Historical Racism
Climate change will exacerbate already-existing racial disparities
related to poverty and, by extension, to imprisonment. People of color are
more vulnerable to harm in the face of environmental crisis because of
structural and historical racism; this in turn increases the risk of
intergenerational poverty-associated incarceration. For example, the
United States has a long history of enforcing racial segregation, through
laws, policies, and violence, that have resulted in Black U.S. residents
being more likely to live in less desirable, low-lying, flood-prone areas.100

95. See ALABAMA’S STATE PRISONS INVESTIGATION, supra note 8, at 3 (explaining the
scope of the investigation “focused on whether ADOC (1) adequately protects prisoners
from physical harm and sexual abuse at the hands of other prisoners; (2) adequately protects
prisoners from use of excessive force and staff sexual abuse by correctional officers; and (3)
provides prisoners with sanitary, secure, and safe living conditions”).
96. See ALA. APPLESEED CTR. FOR L. & JUST., DEATH TRAPS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
ROUTINE, VIOLENT DEATHS OF PEOPLE IN THE CUSTODY OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA, 2014–
2020 3 (2020), https://www.alabamaappleseed.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/DeathTraps-Report-2020-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/RPM5-8NAV].
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See Eddie Burkhalter et al., Incarcerated and Infected: How the Virus Tore Through
the
U.S.
Prison
System,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
10,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2021/04/10/us/covid-prison-outbreak.html?smid=urlshare [https://perma.cc/6EZ4-Q4WY] (“While racial data is not available for cases of
coronavirus in prisons, African-Americans are overrepresented in the system, account for 33
percent of inmates but making up just 13 percent of the nation’s population. For that reason,
public health officials say, they are more likely to be among those infected in prison. The
virus has killed prisoners at higher rates than the general population, the data shows . . . .”).
100. See Jeff Ueland & Barney Warf, Racialized Topographies: Altitude and Race in
Southern Cities, 96 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 50, 50 (2006) (analyzing land acquisition in
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The geographic impacts of structural and historical racism in the United
States are often evident in the wake of natural disasters, including during
Hurricane Katrina101 and the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927.102 The
Great Mississippi Flood displaced thousands and made more than 200,000
Black U.S. residents refugees, many of whom were in the Mississippi
Delta.103 After the flood, Black residents of the refugee camps, along with
incarcerated people, were forced to work to repair the levees for no pay and
under deplorable conditions.104 Today, the Mississippi River still operates
as the country’s “drain”: 31 states and two Canadian provinces drain water
into the Mississippi River; these states comprise 41% of the contiguous
United States and 15% of North America.105 Climate change will only
increase the risk of flooding to these communities along the Mississippi.106
Since 1958, the amount of precipitation during heavy rainstorms has

Southern cities and discussing the various means by which Black U.S. residents have
historically been segregated into geographic areas with land that is more difficult to use and
develop, which is more vulnerable to damage from natural disasters).
101. See Troy D. Allen, Katrina: Race, Class, and Poverty: Reflections and Analysis, 37
J. BLACK STUD. 466, 466 (2007).
102. See generally Susan Scott Parrish, The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 Laid Bare
the Divide Between North and the South, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 11, 2017),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/devastating-mississippi-river-flood-uprootedamericas-faith-progress-180962856/ [https://perma.cc/32UZ-X2GV].
103. See Laura Coyle, The Great Mississippi River Flood of 1927, NAT’L MUSEUM
AFRICAN
AM.
HIST.
&
CULTURE
(Jan.
11,
2019),
https://nmaahc.si.edu/explore/stories/collection/great-mississippi-river-flood-1927
[https://perma.cc/R8LG-A7JH].
104. See, e.g., Ron Grossman, Opinion, The Mississippi River Flood of 1927, CHI. TRIB.
(Jan. 9, 2016, 11:22 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ctmississippi-river-1927-flood-flashback-per-0110-jm-20160107-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6CHF-TWCM]; see also Myles McMurchy, “The Red Cross Is Not All
Right!”: Herbert Hoover’s Concentration Camp Cover-Up in the 1927 Mississippi Flood, 5
YALE
HIST.
REV.
87,
88
(2015),
https://historicalreview.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/McMurchy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JS5E-D834] (describing the treatment of Black Americans in the flood
refugee camps: “Black refugees were forced to perform the heavy labor that supported the
camps and were barred from escaping by National Guard members, who oversaw their work
with guns at the ready”).
105. See generally The Mississippi/Atchafalaya River Basin (MARB), EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/ms-htf/mississippiatchafalaya-river-basin-marb
[https://perma.cc/Q8TX-MEWP] (last visited Nov. 8, 2021).
106. See generally EPA, EPA 430-F-16-026, WHAT CLIMATE CHANGE MEANS FOR
MISSISSIPPI (2016), https://19january2017snapshot.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201609/documents/climate-change-ms.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN7Q-23PT]. See also Top Story of
2019: Impact from Historic Backwater Flood and Recovery Shaped 2019, VICKSBURG POST
(Jan. 1, 2020, 2:30 PM), https://www.vicksburgpost.com/2020/01/01/top-story-of-2019impact-from-historic-backwater-flood-and-recovery-shaped-2019/ [https://perma.cc/DG6UN8QA] (recapping the impact of the 2019 Vicksburg MS. flood that killed two people,
flooded 686 homes, and flooded 548,000 total acres and sent three highways underwater).
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increased by 27% in the Southeast United States.107
Increasing
precipitation as far as the Midwest can increase flood potential in
Mississippi as streamflow drains from these far upriver regions down the
Mississippi River.108 Many prison and jail communities currently live in
locked facilities built on and around the Mississippi River flood plain,
sometimes near majority-minority home communities; in this way,
geography and intergenerational structural racism combine to recapitulate
place- and race-based harms of the past — overexposing already
disproportionately Black and Brown prison and jail communities to
climate-related injuries by locking them in facilities built on flood plains in
the U.S. South.109
In summary, Black Americans in the U.S. South have been
disproportionately forced to reside where increased flooding causes
property damage and displacement; associated economic instability
increases the risk of incarceration; in prisons and jails, residents are
prohibited from mitigating climate-related threats to themselves and to their
home communities, to which most will return; and in this way, historical
racism and structural racism are mutually reinforcing, with incarceration
perpetuating intergenerational overexposure to climate-related harm.
iii. Racial Disparities in Harm Due to Imprisonment
People of color come to prison more medically vulnerable as a
population and are therefore more likely to suffer serious harm as a result
of exposure to environmental stressors caused by climate change. Poor
people and people of color already have significantly worse health
outcomes compared to white or middle to upper-class U.S. residents, and
climate change will only exacerbate those disparities.110 For example,

107. See EPA, supra note 106.
108. See id.
109. See Hannah Hauptman, Prisons and Floods in the United States: Interrogating
Notions of Social and Spatial Control, 7 CHI. J. HIST. 99, 103-107 (2017) (explaining that
“the historical record of the twentieth century confirms that floods frequently affected
prisons, especially those located along the Mississippi River and its tributaries,” and
providing an example: Louisiana State Penitentiary (Angola) “sits nestled into an oxbow on
the east bank of the Lower Mississippi,” so “floods consistently threatened Angola's acres;
fears of evacuation surfaced in 1927,1973, 1983, 1997 and 2011”).
110. See LINDA RUDOLPH ET AL., AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, CLIMATE CHANGE, HEALTH,
AND EQUITY: A GUIDE FOR LOCAL HEALTH DEPARTMENTS 4 (2018), https://www.apha.org//media/files/pdf/topics/climate/apha_climate_equity_
introduction.ashx?la=en&hash=B40A6A0109D9C5474B7C7362176BEA9E9DFC16CC#:~
:text=Climate%20change%20exacerbates%20existing%20health,that%20most%20impact%
20disadvantaged%20communities [https://perma.cc/VS9R-VZBX] (explaining that “critical
components of climate vulnerability are pre-existing health status and living conditions”
which are not distributed equally in the United States and that “[t]hey differ by place, race
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climate change-related increase in air pollution levels are anticipated; Black
and other communities of color already disproportionately live in areas
with poor air quality, which is known to be associated with an increased
incidence of respiratory illness.111 Black U.S. residents are 40% more
likely to have asthma than white U.S. residents and are almost three times
more likely to die from asthma-related causes than the white population.112
Black children are five times more likely to be admitted to the hospital for
asthma as compared to white children.113 The increased temperatures
associated with climate change will also disproportionately impact people
of color — including the overrepresented population of people of color in
U.S. prisons — by making them more likely to suffer harms associated
with high heat, including heat stroke and dehydration.114
Climate change will disproportionately harm the home communities of
prison and jail residents of color, particularly in the U.S. South. Climate
change will hit U.S. residents hardest in the geographic regions that have
the highest rates of incarceration, which disproportionately house prison
residents of color. Since the overwhelming majority of those residents will
return to their communities,115 the climate change related injuries that
residents experience inside will likely follow them home to their
communities, which are more likely to be comprised of people of color.
The majority of Black U.S. residents live in the U.S. South116 and the
South is the region anticipated to be most impacted by climate change.117

and income” which results in “low-income communities and communities of color [being]
disproportionately affected by the health impacts of climate change”).
111. See LEISEROWITZ & AKERLOF, supra note 12 (noting that for low-income and
minority communities “many suffer greater impacts from air pollution” and “will have the
most to gain from policies that will improve air quality”).
112. See generally Asthma and African Americans, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.
(Feb.
11,
2021,
11:16
AM),
https://minorityhealth.hhs.gov/omh/browse.
aspx?lvl=4&lvlid=15 [https://perma.cc/4W4J-ZDAZ].
113. See id.
114. See, e.g., EPA, supra note 106 (explaining that vulnerable populations such as
children, the elderly, the sick, and the poor are at risk from high temperatures which “can
cause heat stroke and dehydration and affect people’s cardiovascular and nervous systems”
and that warmer air helps to “increase . . . ground-level ozone” which aggravates lung
diseases like asthma).
115. See generally MINTON ET AL., supra note 5 (noting statistics for community
correctional supervision in the United States).
116. See, e.g., CHRISTINE TAMIR, PEW RSCH. CTR., THE GROWING DIVERSITY OF BLACK
AMERICA
1,
11
(2021),
https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/wp-content/
uploads/sites/3/2021/03/RE_2021.03.25_Black-Americans_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KVB5-MGDL] (finding that in 2019, 56% of the Black population resided
in the South).
117. See Meyer, supra note 48 (summarizing economists’ projections of the
consequences of climate change on U.S. counties and regions until 2100, and concluding
that the greatest consequences will be seen in the American South).
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Hurricanes, floods, rising temperatures, droughts, and food shortages
attributable to climate change are projected to disproportionately impact the
U.S. South.118 The South has the highest Black population in the country,
and the region consists of states with the highest per capita incarceration
rates in the country.119 Fifty-six percent of Black U.S. residents live in the
South and current migration patterns show that the Black population in the
South has been increasing since 1970 — from an increase from 52% in
1970 to 56% in 2019.120 Researchers have noted this trend, in recent
decades, is the reverse of the “The Great Migration.”121
The U.S. South will bear the worst of climate change across a range of
risk categories.122 Economists estimate that every county between North
Carolina and Texas could see their mortality rate rise by more than 20
people out of every 100,000 people.123 Some counties could also see
agricultural yields fall by more than 50%.124 Southern counties are
expected to lose between 2% to 20% of county-wide income as climate
change effects worsen over the twenty-first century.125 Poverty in these
majority-minority regions is projected to increase. Simultaneously, there is
projected to be a decrease in accessibility of critical and lifesaving services

118. See, e.g., id. (“Harvests will dwindle, summer energy costs will soar, rising sea will
erase real-estate holdings, and heatwaves will set off epidemics of cardiac and pulmonary
disease.”).
119. See E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., NCJ 255115, PRISONERS IN 2019 11
(2020) (finding that for the second consecutive year Louisiana had the highest imprisonment
rate, then Oklahoma, then Mississippi, then Arkansas).
120. See TAMIR, supra note 116, at 11–12 (finding that last available data, from 2019,
shows that 56% of all Black Americans reside in the South).
121. See William H. Frey, The Black Exodus from the North-and West, BROOKINGS (Feb.
2, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2015/02/02/the-black-exodus-fromthe-north-and-west/ [https://perma.cc/983Y-YN2D] (“As a consequence, the 2010 census
showed absolute declines in the black populations of the previous black migrant destinations
of New York, Illinois, Michigan and California — literally a reversal of history.”); see also
William H. Frey, The New Great Migration: Black Americans’ Return to the South, 1965–
2000, BROOKINGS (May 1, 2004), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-new-greatmigration-black-americans-return-to-the-south-1965-2000/ [https://perma.cc/3BPK-ENC4]
(“The South scored net gains of [B]lack migrants from all three of the other regions of the
U.S. during the late 1990s, reversing a 35-year trend.”).
122. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 48 (quoting lead researcher Solomon Hsiang stating:
“The South is really, really negatively affected by climate change, much more so than the
North.”).
123. See, e.g., HSIANG ET AL., supra note 41, at 1364 fig.2B.
124. See, e.g., id. at 1364 fig.2A.
125. See id. at 1366 (projecting that there is a 90% chance that “the poorest third of
counties are projected to experience damage between 2 and 20% of county income” based
on current emissions rates).
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to returning prison residents and their home communities, based in
disproportionately Black and Brown geographic regions of the country. 126
II. COVID-19 PRISON AND JAIL CONDITIONS LITIGATION PROVIDES
INSIGHTS INTO HOW FEDERAL COURTS MAY RESPOND WHEN
RESIDENTS SEEK PRELIMINARY RELIEF FROM EMERGENT CLIMATERELATED DANGERS
The global COVID-19 pandemic and the exogenous threats associated
with global climate change differ in critical ways, including because prison
and jail officials often know far in advance of a crisis the type of climaterelated harm most likely to threaten the wellbeing of residents in their care,
and they may have prepared adequate emergency evacuation, release, and
mitigation plans. Nevertheless, the pandemic and global climate change
pose exogenous public health hazards that are similar in scale and scope,
and which are more deadly to people locked in congregate settings; in some
circumstances, potentially catastrophic events may unfold within similarly
condensed timeframes.
Both suit types also implicate similar or identical legal claims and
jurisdictional hurdles from a conditions-of-confinement litigation
perspective: (1) the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; (2) the right of
individuals with disabilities to be free from disability-based discrimination;
(3) a narrow and jurisdiction-dependent right to “enlargement” of custody
to home confinement or release under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (petition for writ of
habeas corpus on the basis of unlawful conditions of confinement); and (4)
the thorny jurisdictional and remedial barriers imposed by the PLRA and
habeas statutes. Climate change and a global pandemic pose a public
health threat to most people living on the planet, but as to both, prison and
jail residents are at a greater risk of serious harm because they are housed
together in close quarters without the ability, on their own, to take rational
steps to mitigate future harm. Based on these similarities, this Part
provides an analysis of litigation strategies and outcomes relevant to both
contexts. The analysis suggests that federal courts, particularly in the
Southern U.S. and in parts of the Rust Belt, lying within the geographic
boundaries of the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh U.S. Courts of Appeal, will
likely be hesitant to intervene with a grant of preliminary relief, leading to
notably race-disproportionate impacts.

126. See Islam & Winkel, supra note 74, at 2, 4, 12 (reaffirming that “people living in
poverty suffer disproportionately more from the adverse effects of climate change than the
rich,” including specifically from rises in food prices and insurance premiums).
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A. The Clearinghouse Subset: Seventy Prison and Jail Conditions Cases
Seeking Relief Related to COVID-19.
This Section provides an analysis of the structure, claims, and relative
success of a group of 70 COVID-19 prison and jail conditions cases, filed
in 2020 and 2021, seeking preliminary or emergency injunctive relief or
release on behalf of multiple persons.
The University of Michigan Law School’s Civil Rights Litigation
Clearinghouse (Clearinghouse) compiles, codes, analyzes, and topically
organizes data on prison conditions litigation in which injunctive relief127
“affecting multiple persons”128 is sought. There is no automated means by
which to monitor the subject matter of all prison and jail litigation, filed in
all federal jurisdictions, at all times. While the Clearinghouse does not limit
its coverage to successful cases, such cases are somewhat more likely to
come to its attention.129 Cases that succeed rather than fail are typically
longer-lived and more widely discussed.130
The group of 70 cases reviewed in this Article is a subset of the larger
pool of 463 cases that are within the Clearinghouse’s “COVID-19 special
collection.” As of September 2021, that collection included 463 cases. Of
these, 99 were jail or prison conditions cases. Of those, excluding three
cases that sought only individual relief, 70 were federal court cases.131
This subset of 70 federal court prison and jail conditions cases, through
which residents sought relief from COVID-19-related dangers, is referred

127. See Case Category Specifics, UNIV. MICH. L. SCH. C.R. LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE,
https://clearinghouse.net/about.php?s=types [https://perma.cc/M3EZ-HGJJ] (last visited
Nov. 7, 2021); see also What Is the Clearinghouse?, UNIV. MICH. L. SCH. C.R. LITIG.
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.clearinghouse.net/about.php [https://perma.cc/2S32-UVDB]
(last visited Jan. 16, 2022) (providing that the Clearinghouse “brings together and analyzes
information and documents about important civil rights cases across the United States”; that
it “is organized by case category”; and that it “is dedicated to injunctive relief rather than
damages litigation”).
128. See Special Collection: COVID-19 (Novel Coronavirus), UNIV. MICH. L. SCH. C.R.
LITIG. CLEARINGHOUSE, https://clearinghouse.net/results.php?searchSpecialCollection=62
[https://perma.cc/M6HP-9EEH] (last visited Nov. 12, 2021) (providing that the collection,
which includes a supplemental CSV report, includes “cases that address the challenges
posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, social distancing, etc.,” but not “every single-person
request for release”; instead, the collection includes “cases affecting multiple persons”). The
site also directs users to two other sources: (1) The Most Significant Criminal Justice Policy
Changes from the COVID-19 Pandemic, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Oct. 12, 2021),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/virus/virusresponse.html#resources [https://perma.cc/CJ5PGFHC] and (2) Covid Behind Bars Data Project, UCLA L. SCH.,
https://uclacovidbehindbars.org [https://perma.cc/77YU-FJ54] (last visited Jan. 11, 2022).
129. From the Authors’ discussions with the founder and Director of Clearinghouse,
Margo Schlanger, during the fall and winter of 2021–2022.
130. See id.
131. See infra notes 132–43.
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to in this Article as the “Clearinghouse subset” or the “Subset.”
Observations made in this Article about the Clearinghouse subset are based
on a combination of novel data and Clearinghouse data.
The Subset includes cases from all U.S. Courts of Appeal except for the
Federal Circuit: four cases from the First Circuit;132 six cases from the
Second Circuit;133 five cases from the Third Circuit;134 seven cases from
the Fourth Circuit;135 11 cases from the Fifth Circuit;136 six cases from the
Sixth Circuit;137 five cases from the Seventh Circuit;138 three cases from the

132. See generally Denbow v. Me. Dep’t. of Corr., No. 1:20-cv-00175 (D. Me. May 15,
2020); Baez v. McDonald, No. 1:20-cv-10753 (D. Mass. Apr. 17, 2020); Grinis v.
Spaulding, No. 1:20-cv-10738 (D. Mass. Apr. 15, 2020); Savino v. Hodgson, No. 1:20-cv10617 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2020).
133. See generally Harper v. Cuomo, No. 9:21-cv-00019-LEK-ML (N.D.N.Y Jan. 8,
2021); Azor-El v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Corr., No. 1:20-cv-03650 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2020);
Fernandez-Rodriguez v. Licon-Vitale, No. 1:20-cv-03315-ER (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020);
Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, No. 3:20-cv-000569 (D. Conn. Apr. 27, 2020); McPherson v.
Lamont, No. 3:20-cv-00534-JBA (D. Conn. Apr. 20, 2020); Chunn v. Edge, No. 1:20-cv01590 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2020).
134. See generally Brown v. Warren, No. 1:20-cv-07907-NLH-AMD (D.N.J. June 26,
2020); Wragg v. Ortiz, No. 20-cv-05496-RMB (D.N.J. May 4, 2020); Remick v.
Philadelphia, No. 2:20-cv-01959-BMS (E.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2020); Brown v. Marler, No.
2:20-cv-01914-AB (E.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2020); Graham v. Allegheny Cnty., No. 20-cv-00496
(W.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 2020).
135. See generally Catchings v. Wilson, No. 1:21-cv-00428-GLR (D. Md. Feb. 20,
2021); Baxley v. Jividen, No. 3:18-cv-01526 (S.D. W. Va. July, 27, 2020); Hallinan v.
Scarantino, No. 20-hc-02088-FL (E.D.N.C. May 26, 2020); Seth v. McDonough, No. 20-cv01028 (D. Md. Apr. 21, 2020); Whorley v. Northam, No. 20-cv-00255 (E.D. Va. Apr. 8,
2020); Hallinan v. Scarantino, No. 20-cv-00563-M (E.D.N.C. Oct. 26, 2020); Duvall v.
Hogan, No. 1:94-cv-02541-ELH (D. Md. Sept. 14, 1994).
136. See generally Blake v. Carr, No. 4:20-cv-00807-P (N.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2020) (cases
consolidated June 4, 2021, then de-consolidated; the new case number assigned postconsolidation is 4:20-cv-854); Waddell v. Taylor, No. 20-cv-00340-TSL-RHW (S.D. Miss.
May 14, 2020); Belton v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Prison, No. 3:20-cv-00278-BAJ-SDJ
(M.D. La. May 4, 2020); Gumns v. Edwards, No. 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB (M.D. La. Apr.
14, 2020); Sanchez v. Brown, No. 20-cv-00832-E (N.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2020); Livas v. Myers,
No. 2:20-cv-00422-TAD-KK (W.D. La. Apr. 6, 2020); Valentine v. Collier, No. 20-cv01115 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 30, 2020); Amos v. Hall, No. 4:20-cv-00007-DMB-JMV (N.D. Miss.
Jan. 14, 2020); Russell v. Harris Cnty., No. 4:19-cv-00226 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 2019); United
States v. Hinds Cnty., No. 16-cv-00489-WHB-JCG (S.D. Miss. June 23, 2016); Lewis v.
Cain, No. 15-cv-00318-BAJ-RLB (M.D. La. May 20, 2015).
137. See generally Busby v. Bonner, No. 2:20-cv-02359 (W.D. Tenn. May 20, 2020);
Smith v. Dewine, No. 20-cv-02471-EAS-KAJ (S.D. Ohio May 15, 2020); Russell v. Wayne
Cnty., No. 20-cv-11094-MAG-EAS (E.D. Mich. May 4, 2020); Abrams v. Chapman, No.
20-cv-11053-MAG-RSW (E.D. Mich. Apr. 29, 2020); Cameron v. Bouchard, No. 20-cv10949-LVP-MJH (E.D. Mich. Apr. 17, 2020); Wilson v. Williams, No. 20-cv-00794-JG
(N.D. Ohio Apr. 13, 2020).
138. See generally Mays v. Dart, No. 20-cv-02134 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 3, 2020); Money v.
Jeffreys, No. 20-cv-02094 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2020); Money v. Pritzker, No. 20-cv-02093
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2020); Smith v. Barr, No. 20-cv-00630 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 25, 2020); Dobbey
v. Weilding, No. 13-cv-01068 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2013).

2022]

HELL AND HIGH WATER

287

Eighth Circuit;139 15 cases from the Ninth Circuit;140 three cases from the
Tenth Circuit;141 three cases from the Eleventh Circuit;142 and two cases
from the D.C. Circuit.143
Most cases in the subset were brought in 2020, with a small number of
additional cases brought in 2021. Just under a dozen of the subset cases are
pre-existing jail or prison conditions lawsuits, filed prior to the emergence
of COVID-19, in which litigants sought COVID-19-related relief as part of
existing active litigation or existing settlement agreements.144 The
outcomes in these cases are notable, as it is likely that litigants in existing
conditions cases would attempt to seek relief through them if a climaterelated emergency threatened that incarcerated or detained community.
Attempts by litigants to obtain COVID-19-related relief through existing
jail and prison conditions cases were roughly half unsuccessful145 and half
139. See generally Frazier v. Kelley, No. 20-cv-00434-KGB-JJV (E.D. Ark. Apr. 21,
2020); Malcolm v. Starr, No. 20-cv-02503 (D. Minn. Dec. 9, 2020); Sabata v. Neb. Dep’t of
Corr. Servs., No. 17-cv-03107-RFR-MDN (D. Neb. Aug. 15, 2017).
140. See generally Criswell v. Boudreaux, No. 20-cv-01048-DAD-SAB (E.D. Cal. July
29, 2020); Fenty v. Penzone, No. 20-cv-01192-SPL-JZB (D. Ariz. June 16, 2020); Torres v.
Milusnic, No. 20-cv-04450-CBM-PVC (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2020); Wilson v. Ponce, No. 20cv-00451 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2020); Lucero-Gonzalez v. Kline, No. 20-cv-00901-DJHDMF (D. Ariz. May 8, 2020); Ahlman v. Barnes, No. 8:20-cv-00835 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30,
2020); Alvarez v. LaRose, No. 20-cv-00782-DMS-AHG (S.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2020); Cullors
v. Los Angeles, No. 20-cv-03760-RGK-PLA (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2020); Maney v. Brown,
No. 20-cv-00570 (D. Or. Apr. 6, 2020); Mayes v. Sacramento, No. 18-cv-02081-TLN-KJN
(E.D. Cal. July 31, 2018); Murray v. Santa Barbara, No. 17-cv-08805-GW-JPR (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 6, 2017); Gray v. Cnty. of Riverside, No. 13-cv-00444-VAP-OP (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8,
2013); Parsons v. Ryan, No. 12-cv-00601-NVW-MEA (D. Ariz. Mar. 22, 2012); Plata v.
Newsom, No. 01-cv-01351-JST (N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2001); Coleman v. Newsom, No. 2:90cv-00520-KJM-DB (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 1990).
141. See generally Weikert v. Elder, No. 20-cv-03646 (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 2020); Carranza
v. Reams, No. 20-cv-00977 (D. Colo. Apr. 7, 2020); Nellson v. Barnhart, No. 20-cv-00756
(D. Colo. Mar. 18, 2020).
142. See generally Jones v. Hill, No. 1:20-cv-02791-JPB-CCB (N.D. Ga. July 1, 2020);
Barnett v. Tony, No. 0:20-cv-61113 (S.D. Fla. June 5, 2020); Swain v. Junior, No. 20-cv21457 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2020).
143. See generally Williams v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 20-cv-00890 (D.D.C. Apr. 2,
2020); Banks v. Booth, No. 1:20-cv-00849 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2020).
144. See infra notes 145–46.
145. See, e.g., Duvall v. Hogan, No. ELH-94-2541, 2020 WL 3402301, at *11 (D. Md.
June 19, 2020) (bringing an emergency motion for relief within a pre-existing jail conditions
settlement agreement retained under court jurisdiction; motion denied as speculative and
unlikely to succeed on the merits of the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference
component); Lewis v. Cain, No. 15-318-SDD-RLB, 2020 WL 1614424, at *3 (M.D. La.
Apr. 2, 2020) (moving for a TRO to prevent the transfer of prison residents with COVID-19
to Angola (LSP); TRO denied as procedurally inappropriate within the existing litigation
and as not likely to succeed on the merits of the Eighth Amendment claim); Amos v. Hall,
No. 20-cv-00007, 2020 WL 1978382, at *11 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 24, 2020) (moving for a TRO
within a pre-existing prison conditions case; TRO denied on multiple grounds: (a) not likely
to succeed on the merits as to the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference component;
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successful.146 Therefore, as a group of cases, the pre-existing cases within
the Clearinghouse subset were more successful in obtaining COVID-19
relief for litigants than were all litigants in the undivided Clearinghouse
subset. In the undivided subset of 70 cases, approximately one third
obtained some form of COVID-19 mitigation, either as preliminary relief
or as court-ordered relief within an existing case.
The focus of this analysis is on litigants’ success in obtaining emergency
injunctive relief to address COVID-19 related hazards. Unless otherwise

(b) failed to show irreparable harm would occur after accounting for protective measures as
required by the Fifth Circuit in its reversal of the district court in Valentine v. Collier, 956
F.3d 797, 801 (5th Cir. 2020); and (c) the public interest would be harmed by granting the
injunction); Order at 2, Parsons v. Shinn, No. 12-cv-00601-PHX-ROS (D. Ariz. Mar. 23,
2020), ECF No. 3540 (denying plaintiffs’ emergency motion regarding COVID-19 because
no provision in the existing stipulated agreement clearly authorized the type of order sought,
however, the court subsequently found in Parsons v. Shinn, No. 12-cv-00601-PHX-ROS,
2020 WL 1640532 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 2020), the provision of certain COVID-19 information
to be within the agreement and ordered it produced); Sabata v. Neb. Dep’t of Corr. Servs.,
No. 17-cv-03107-BCB-MDN (D. Neb. Aug. 15, 2017) (filing an emergency motion for
disclosure and discovery within a pre-existing prison conditions case, which does not appear
to have been granted); Dobbey v. Weilding, No. 13-cv-01068 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 2013)
(seeking temporary appointment of a Special Master to oversee the COVID-19 response in
the prison; motion not granted).
146. See Coleman v. Newsom, 455 F. Supp. 3d 926, 927 (E.D. Cal. 2020) (denying, in a
statewide prison conditions case active for over 30 years, the Coleman Plaintiffs’ motion to
the three-judge court to modify the existing population cap in that case — a rarely-granted
PLRA prisoner release order; but note these same plaintiffs subsequently successfully
obtained broad COVID-19 protective measures from the district court enforcing their
existing consent decree; see Coleman v. Newsom, No. 90-cv-00520 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23,
1990)); Class-Action Order, Mays v. Cnty. of Sacramento, No. 2:18-cv-02081 (E.D. Cal.
Apr. 27, 2020) (incorporating COVID-19 mitigation measures into the monitoring and
requirements for complying with the pre-existing consent decree governing conditions at the
jail); Gray v. Cnty. of Riverside, No. 13-cv-00444, 2020 WL 4249989, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May
8, 2013) (motion to modify or enforce existing consent decree in response to the pandemic
was granted, resulting in promulgation of court-appointed expert recommendations and a
robust stipulated agreement between the parties); Second Medical Monitoring Report, Mays,
No. 2:18-cv-0208; Coleman v. Newsom, No. 90-cv-00520 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 1990)
(incorporating COVID-19 mitigation measures into the monitoring and requirements for
complying with the pre-existing consent decree governing mental healthcare provision in
California’s prison system); Court-Appointed Monitor’s 10th Monitoring Rep., United
States v. Hinds Cnty., No. 16-cv-00489-JCG (S.D. Miss. June 23, 2016) (incorporating
COVID-19 mitigation measures into the monitoring and requirements for complying with
the pre-existing settlement agreement governing conditions at the jail); see also Transcript
Order, Plata v. Newsom, No. 01-01351 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2021) (incorporating COVID-19
mitigation measures into the monitoring and requirements for compliance). Recently, the
court issued an order, pursuant to the Receiver’s recommendation, requiring vaccines for
staff and incarcerated workers entering institutions and for residents who accept in-person
visitation. See Plata, No. 01-cv-01351, 2021 WL 4448953 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2021). But
see Plata v. Newsom, 445 F. Supp. 3d 557, 569 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (denying plaintiffs’ initial
motion for a reduction in population density within the pre-existing consent decree and
receivership governing medical care provision in California’s prison system).
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stated, this Article uses the word “cases” to include the habeas petitions in
the subset, and it uses “emergency relief” and “preliminary relief”
interchangeably to include (a) preliminary injunctive relief sought in new
and existing cases; (b) emergency court orders sought in pre-existing
litigation; and (c) emergency release sought through class-wide petitions
for habeas corpus.
The analysis asks (1) was emergency relief sought; (2) in what type of
action; (3) bringing what claims; (4) was relief in any measure granted and
why or why not; and (5) if granted and an appeal was taken, what was the
outcome, and why.
B. Similar Context: An Emergent, Exogenous Threat to Public Health,
with Substantially Increased Risk to People Living in Prisons and Jails
Part I of this Article discussed the unique health and safety threats posed
by climate change to people in prison and jails. Millions of people are
living in U.S. prisons and jails through an age of record-breaking
heatwaves, increasingly destructive floods, more frequent and deadlier
storms, deeper freezes, and weather-related infrastructure failures. Prison
and jail residents and imprisoned communities are at greater risk of harm
because they cannot leave unsafe geographic locations, build weatherproof
structures to protect themselves, or engage in other climate-adaptive
behaviors, such as stockpiling emergency supplies, while detained or
imprisoned in locked facilities.
In the COVID-19 pandemic context, residents cannot fashion their own
soap, source their own disinfectant, or leave crowded dorms to socially
distance themselves.147 According to The Journal of the American Medical
Association, incarcerated people are infected by COVID-19 at a rate more
than five times higher than the nation’s overall infection rate, and the
reported death rate for people in prison (39 deaths per 100,000) is
substantially higher than the national rate (29 deaths per 100,000).148 The
New York Times reported that one in three people incarcerated in state
prisons are known to have had COVID-19, and that prisons, jails, and
detention centers in the United States have been among the most dangerous
147. See generally Reducing Jail and Prison Populations During the Covid-19
Pandemic, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/ourwork/research-reports/reducing-jail-and-prison-populations-during-covid-19-pandemic
[https://perma.cc/89WD-MPNK].
148. Brendan Saloner et al., COVID-19 Cases and Deaths in Federal and State Prisons,
324 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 602, 602–03 (2020) (providing a standardized calculation accounting
for the smaller population of individuals aged 65 and older in the U.S. prison population,
that shows an adjusted death rate in the prison population of three times higher than would
be expected if the age and sex distributions of the United States and prison populations were
equal).
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places in the country with regards to COVID-19 infection with more than
1,400 new infections and seven deaths, on average, reported inside those
facilities each day.149 According to researchers at the World Bank and
Northwestern University, the U.S. jail and prison system acts, as described
by National Public Radio, as an “epidemic engine” that “is driven by a
massive number of people who . . . have been cycling between cramped
detention facilities and their home communities,” resulting in millions of
preventable COVID-19 cases in the United States.150
COVID-19 is aggressively contagious,151 it can survive outside of the
human body,152 and the disease can cause severe lung damage, respiratory
failure, and require a patient be mechanically ventilated to stay alive.153
COVID-19 can also disable other organs, including the heart, blood
vessels, kidneys, and brain.154 Individuals with particular medical
conditions are at a higher risk of severe illness from COVID-19. 155 People
with COVID-19 may be infectious days before symptoms appear, meaning
that even by the time people report symptoms, many more people they

149. See Burkhalter et al., supra note 99.
150. Bill Chappell, Crowded U.S. Jails Drive Millions of COVID-19 Cases, A New Study
Says,
NPR
(Sept.
2,
2021,
11:00
AM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/09
/02/1033326204/crowded-jails-drove-millions-of-covid-19-cases-a-new-study-says
[https://perma.cc/MVJ6-ZPWW].
151. See, e.g., E.J. Mundell, Exhaled ‘Aerosols’ Spread Coronavirus up to 13 Feet — and
Shoes
Carry
the
Virus,
Too,
MED.
XPRESS
(Apr.
17,
2020),
https://medicalxpress.com/news/2020-04-exhaled-aerosols-coronavirusfeetand-virus.html
[https://perma.cc/J6KS-K6NP]; Knvul Sheikh, Talking Can Generate Coronavirus Droplets
that
Linger
up
to
14
Minutes,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
2,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/14/health/coronavirus-infections.html
[https://perma.cc/XZQ6-57GC].
152. See Marilynn Marchione, Tests Show New Coronavirus Lives on Some Surfaces for
up to 3 Days, ABC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2020, 3:41 PM), https://abcnews.
go.com/US/wireStory/tests-show-virus-lives-surfaces-days-69534882
[https://perma.cc/R43Y-AFHM].
153. See Bruce Y. Lee, How Does the COVID-19 Coronavirus Kill? What Happens
When
You
Get
Infected,
FORBES
(Mar.
21,
2020,
10:00
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucelee/2020/03/21/how-does-the-covid-19-coronavirus-killwhat-happens-when-you-get-infected/#3abaaff56146 [https://perma.cc/BJT6-L4GL].
154. See Meredith Wadman et al., A Rampage Through the Body, SCI. (Apr. 17, 2020),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/04/how-does-coronavirus-kill-clinicians-traceferocious-rampage-through-body-brain-toes# [https://perma.cc/UML2-WY8C].
155. People with Certain Medical Conditions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Oct. 14, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extraprecautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html [https://perma.cc/LXC9-9PD8] (including
individuals with asthma, heart conditions, immunocompromising diseases such as HIV or
AIDS, diabetes, or kidney disease).
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were in contact with may already have been infected.156 A rapid response
is therefore critical to preventing further spread. In a prison or jail setting,
waiting even 24 hours between reporting of symptoms and isolation can
substantially increase the risk of unnecessarily infecting scores of
individuals housed with the symptomatic person.157 A rapid response is
also necessary to prevent irreparable harm because COVID-19 patients,
particularly those with certain underlying medical conditions, can
deteriorate rapidly and irreversibly after contracting the disease or
presenting with symptoms.158 One study, for example, found that 17% of
their subjects developed Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome shortly after
the first onset of COVID-19 symptoms, and, among those, 65% rapidly
worsened and died from multiple organ failure.159
Taken together, this Article hypothesizes that COVID-19 conditions
litigation may be analyzed as a highly approximated partial simulation for
what climate change-related litigation might look like when assessed as an
exogenous public health threat that is uniquely dangerous to people
confined in locked prison and jail facilities, who cannot leave a dangerous
physical location or take rational steps on their own to mitigate potential
harm.
C. Similar Form: Climate-Related and COVID-19 Conditions Litigants
Will Seek Preliminary Relief in the Form of Release or Mitigation
This Article mainly focuses on preliminary injunctive relief and
analogous emergency relief or release because many, though not all,
climate-related threats will call for swift court intervention in the face of an
anticipated climate change-related harm. The Subset includes actions
seeking emergency release, injunctions, or court orders pursuant to
emergency petitions and motions in both new and ongoing matters. In
each, plaintiffs asked the court to require that prison or jail officials release

156. See, e.g., Kelly MacNamara, People with COVID-19 May Be Infectious Days Before
Symptoms: Study, MED. XPRESS (Apr. 15, 2020), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2020-04people-covid-infectious-dayssymptoms.html [https://perma.cc/SMD5-NB5S].
157. See, e.g., Report of Homer Venters at 12–13, Waddell v. Taylor, No. 3:20-cv-00340
(S.D. Miss. May 25, 2020). Homer Venters is a physician, internist, epidemiologist and
former Medical Director, Assistant Commissioner, and Chief Medical Officer of the
Correctional Health Services of New York City; in that role he was responsible for all
aspects of health services including physical and mental health, addiction, quality
improvement, re-entry and morbidity and mortality reviews as well as all training and
oversight of physicians, nurses, and pharmacy staff caring for all persons held in New York
City’s 12 jails. See id. at 2–3.
158. See, e.g., Sevim Zaim et al., COVID-19 and Multiorgan Response, 45 CURRENT
PROBS. CARDIOLOGY 100618 (2020).
159. See id.
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them from the facility and/or take affirmative steps to better protect them;
in each, the outcome sought was injunctive relief or its functional
equivalent on an emergency basis.
An injunction is a court order that requires the nonmovant to do or to
abstain from doing a particular action.160 Injunctive relief of any type is
considered an extraordinary equitable remedy requiring that the applicant
unequivocally show the need for issuance.161 Plaintiffs seeking a
permanent injunction at the merits stage of a lawsuit must prevail on the
merits and establish that equitable relief in the form of an injunction is
appropriate in all respects, including because state officials are unlikely to
take required corrective action absent an injunction.162 Plaintiffs seeking
preliminary relief must satisfy an even higher burden because they seek a
court’s order requiring the outcome sought before the court has passed on
the merits of the case.163
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) governs the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO), which may only last for a 14-day
period.164 If a plaintiff seeks preliminary relief beyond an initial 14-day
period, the plaintiff may additionally move for a preliminary injunction, or
a court may construe a motion for a TRO as a motion for a preliminary
injunction. The plaintiff may also move only for a preliminary injunction.
To obtain preliminary relief in the form of a TRO or a preliminary
injunction, the plaintiff must satisfy the substantive requirements for a
preliminary injunction.165
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(a) governs the issuance of a
preliminary injunction, which may be granted before or during trial and
before the final judgment. In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the
applicant must demonstrate all four of the following elements: (1) a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that
the movant will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied; (3) that

160. See ROBERT HENLEY EDEN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS 1–2 (Jacob D.
Wheeler ed., 1822).
161. See, e.g., Sepulvado v. Jindal, 729 F.3d 413, 417 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 1789 (2014).
162. See, e.g., Dresser-Rand Co. v. Virtual Automation Inc., 361 F.3d 831, 847–48 (5th
Cir. 2004); Hay v. Waldron, 834 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1987).
163. See McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[A]
preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the
movant clearly established the ‘burden of persuasion’ as to each of the four requisites.”); see
also Justin Indus., Inc. v. Choctaw Sec., L.P., 920 F.2d 262, 269 n.7 (5th Cir. 1990)
(providing that courts should compel certain actions through granting mandatory injunctive
relief where the movant shows a clear entitlement to the relief under the facts and the law).
164. See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)(2).
165. See Clark v. Pritchard, 812 F.2d 991, 993 (5th Cir. 1987) (providing that the same
standard applies to both a TRO and a preliminary injunction).
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the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunction might cause
the defendant; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the public
interest.166 All four elements are mixed questions of law and fact.167
In the 70 subset cases reviewed, nearly all sought preliminary relief in
the form of a TRO, a preliminary injunction, or both. The handful that did
not seek preliminary relief were uniquely situated, for example, as
settlement monitoring phase or pro se litigation.168 As would be expected
in climate change conditions litigation, plaintiffs in COVID-19 conditions
litigation sought preliminary relief in the form of either court-ordered
release or court-ordered mitigation.169
Of the 70 cases in the subset, the overwhelming majority sought release
of plaintiffs or of one or more plaintiff subclasses as a form of preliminary
relief: only a few cases within the subset sought mitigation alone and not
any form of release.170 Of the 70 cases in the subset, approximately one

166. See Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see also Jackson
Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 760 F.3d 448, 452 (5th Cir. 2014).
167. See Hoover v. Morales, 164 F.3d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1998).
168. See, e.g., Court-Appointed Monitor’s Tenth Monitoring Report, supra note 146
(addressing COVID-19 mitigation issues as part of ongoing jail conditions monitoring of
existing settlement agreement); Complaint, Blake v. Carr, No. 20-cv-807-P (N.D. Tex. Aug.
3, 2020) (consolidated then deconsolidated action by over 70 women prison residents pro se
regarding COVID-19 mitigation).
169. The type of mitigation requested and ordered as relief in the subset varied widely,
but most content tracked the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidance on
measures that correctional facilities should take to mitigate risk of infection and severe
illness due to COVID-19 infection in prisons and jail settings. Interim Guidance on
Management of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Correctional and Detention
Facilities, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 9, 2021),
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/correction-detention/guidancecorrectional-detention.html [https://perma.cc/S53D-23EM]. Suggested measures include
steps facilities should take for prevention of the spread of COVID-19, including hygiene
practices, routine cleaning, symptom screening, social distancing, and testing; they also
include steps facilities should take when managing individuals with confirmed or suspected
COVID-19 inside the facility, including regarding quarantining and medical isolation.
Courts over-relied on the CDC Guidance in rejecting particular forms of relief sought as
exceeding minimum constitutional standards if such relief was not specifically enumerated
in the CDC Guidance. See generally Conditions of Confinement, COVID-19, and the CDC,
134 HARV. L. REV. 2233 (2021) (surveying COVID-19 prison conditions cases and
concluding that courts throughout the pandemic have relied on and deferred to CDC
Guidance to assess the viability of plaintiffs’ conditions of confinement claims, in
contravention of established norms within both administrative and constitutional law).
170. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint for Injunctive & Declaratory Relief, Waddell v.
Taylor, No. 20-cv-00340-TSL-RHW (S.D. Miss. May 14, 2020); Complaint, Gumns v.
Edwards, No. 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB (M.D. La. Apr. 14, 2020) (seeking mitigation and a
court order preventing transfer of detainees with COVID-19 to Angola (LSP); TRO denied);
Amos v. Hall, No. 4:20-cv-00007-DMB-JMV (N.D. Miss. Jan. 14, 2020) (seeking
mitigation only within a pre-existing prison conditions case; TRO denied). Parties entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding voluntarily withdrew their motion for a TRO and
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third were granted some form of COVID-19 mitigation as preliminary
relief within a new or existing case or as court-ordered relief within an
existing case. However, only a few cases in the subset successfully
obtained, as preliminary relief, some form of release or a court order
requiring the defendant to implement a process for meaningfully
considering applications for release; such relief was granted by federal
district courts in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and California (which are
within the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits, respectively).171
Request for release, in these cases, refers to a range of legal mechanisms
by which plaintiffs sought to be allowed to leave prison or jail temporarily

preliminary injunction. See Motion to Withdraw Motion for TRO, Waddell, No. 20-cv00340, and the court granted a joint motion to stay proceedings pending negotiations. See
Order, Waddell, No. 20-cv-00340; see also Stipulated Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
Weikert v. Elder, No. 20-cv-03646 (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 2020); Order Granting Stipulated
Motion, Weikert, No. 20-cv-03646.
171. See, e.g., Memorandum of Decision at 2, Savino v. Hodgson, No. 20-cv-10617WGY (D. Mass. May 12, 2020) (explaining that “[t]he Court has matched the unusual
health emergency with an unusual procedural maneuver,” and that “[b]efore addressing the
merits of the petition, the Court relied on its inherent authority expeditiously to review bail
applications for all of the detainees in the class, one by one, and released almost a third of
them to house arrest under strict conditions”; the Court continued: “These releases have
meaningfully reduced the crowding at the detention center and, one hopes, hindered the
virus’ spread”); see also Ruling on Motion for TRO and Motion to Dismiss at 3 n.1, 27–29,
31, 33, 55, 60, Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, No. 3:20-cv-000569 (MPS) (D. Conn. May 12,
2020) (ordering the federal prison defendants to implement “a process by which inmates
would be evaluated promptly for transfer to home confinement,” mandating “individualized
consideration . . . on a basis more accelerated and more focused on the critical factors of
inmate and public safety than the current home confinement review process,” and explicitly
holding that the Order (1) does not divest the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) of its sentencing
authority or its statutory and regulatory discretion, but “merely directs the Respondents to
exercise the authority already conferred on them to place inmates in home confinement and
consider requests for compassionate release in a manner that does not violate the Eighth
Amendment”; and (2) does not run afoul of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18
U.S.C. § 3626, res judicata, or claim preclusion); Torres v. Milusnic, 472 F. Supp. 3d 713,
746-747 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (ordering, along with other relief, BOP to institute a process
through which it must consider people over the age of 50 for home confinement if they have
at least one health condition that puts them at risk of serious illness from COVID-19); Plata
v. Newsom, 445 F. Supp. 3d 557, 561–69 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (denying plaintiffs’ initial
motion for a reduction in population density within the pre-existing consent decree and
receivership governing medical care provision in California’s prison system). But see
Transcript Order, Plata, No. cv-01-01351 (incorporating robust COVID-19 mitigation
measures into the monitoring and requirements for compliance, including several early
release programs designed to reduce population density); Order on Defendant’s COVID-19
Plan at 8, 12, Gray v. Cnty. of Riverside, No. 13-cv-00444 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2020)
(motion to modify or enforce existing consent decree in response to the pandemic was
granted, resulting in an April 14, 2020, court order (ECF No. 193) to develop a COVID-19
plan; the plan incorporates a requirement to consider release for vulnerable populations and
a requirement to achieve physical distancing according to an adjusted capacity plan,
including through use of the jail’s electronic ankle monitor program and federal release for
low level inmates).
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or permanently to go to a location where social distancing was possible.
These included, for example, unconditional or conditional release into the
community, including through electronic ankle monitoring, home
confinement, or house arrest.172 The legal mechanisms varied, but included
seeking compassionate release, implementation of expedited procedures to
reconsider or increase the number of individuals released through existing
release programs, and temporary enlargement of custody or bail pending
habeas corpus (when sought via class-wide petition for writ of habeas
corpus, which requires alleging an underlying violation of rights related to
conditions of confinement).173 The latter mechanism is discussed in a later
Section of this Article.
Plaintiffs’ requests for release as relief in cases requesting COVID-19related emergency injunctions had a very low rate of success among the
cases in the subset overall; however, there were successes, most notably
within cases enforcing pre-existing consent decrees, some of which applied
to incarcerated communities composed of tens of thousands of
individuals.174 The more typical denial of release as preliminary release
during the COVID-19 pandemic suggests that future litigants facing threats
of climate-related catastrophe should likely not solely request release as
relief.
D. Similar Content: Climate-Related and COVID-19 Conditions
Litigants Will Bring the Same or Similar Legal Claims
COVID-19 conditions litigation outcomes are relevant to future climaterelated conditions litigation because there are a finite number of legal
claims and action types that apply in prison and jail conditions
jurisprudence, and because legal arguments made by plaintiffs in both
contexts will arise from analogous factual scenarios: an exogenous public
health and safety crisis poised to inflict more harm on incarcerated and
detained people because of their confinement. This Section describes the
three main claims brought, and one alternative type of action deployed,
within the 70 COVID-19 prison and jail matters reviewed. It also considers

172. See infra note 174.
173. See infra note 174.
174. See, e.g., Plata, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 561–69 (incorporating several early release
programs designed to reduce population density in response to the pandemic within the preexisting consent decree and receivership governing medical care provision in California’s
prison system); Order on Defendant’s COVID-19 Plan, supra note 171, at 8, 12 (ordering a
plan for the Riverside County adult jail system, comprising four correctional facilities and
incorporating a requirement to consider release for vulnerable populations and a
requirement to achieve physical distancing according to an adjusted capacity plan).
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the implications of their outcomes as applied to potential future climaterelated corrections litigation.
First, this Section discusses federal constitutional claims — Eighth
Amendment and Due Process Clause claims (alleging violative conditions
of confinement). Second, it discusses federal statutory claims brought
under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA),175 and
pursuant to the regulations implementing Title II of the ADA in Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act (RA), alleging unlawful discrimination
against persons with disabilities.176 Third, it discusses an alternative type
of action brought by some plaintiffs in the COVID-19 prison and jail
litigation subset: class-wide petitions for habeas corpus (seeking relief from
unlawful conditions of confinement through alleging violations of the
Eighth Amendment, Due Process Clause, the ADA, and/or the RA).
i. Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clause (Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment) Claims: Conditions of Confinement
People held in custody post-conviction, typically in prisons, have rights
regarding conditions of confinement that arise from their constitutional
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment. The conditions in which they are confined may amount to
punishment,177 but those conditions may not amount to cruel and unusual
punishment,178 which is prohibited under the Eighth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.179 A resident must show “deliberate indifference” to a
qualifying basic need.180 Deliberate indifference has two prongs: (1) an
objective element, the requirement of a serious medical need or a risk181 of
serious harm;182 and (2) a subjective element, the requirement that prison

175. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111.
176. 29 U.S.C. § 701.
177. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 300 (1991) (explaining that “the Eighth
Amendment . . . bans only cruel and unusual punishment,” and that “[i]f the pain inflicted is
not formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing judge, some mental
element must be attributed to the [defendant] before it can qualify” as cruel and unusual
punishment).
178. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1300–01 (5th Cir. 1974) (providing that
the Eight Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment “is not limited to
specific acts directed at selected individuals, but is equally pertinent to general conditions of
confinement that may prevail at a prison”).
179. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
180. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976).
181. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33–34 (1993) (providing that a risk of future
harm is a cognizable injury under the Eighth Amendment: “It would be odd to deny an
injunction to inmates who plainly proved an unsafe, life-threatening condition in their prison
on the ground that nothing yet had happened to them”).
182. See, e.g., Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
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officials knew or should have known of a substantial risk of serious harm
and that they disregarded it.183 The standard is determined under modern,
or evolving, standards of decency.184 A resident will not be able to
establish an Eighth Amendment violation if defendants can show that they
responded reasonably to the risk of harm.185 It is very difficult for a prison
resident to prevail in establishing that a prison condition amounts to cruel
and unusual punishment,186 since the deliberate indifference standard
requires one to establish that the defendants acted with subjective criminal
recklessness.187
People held in custody prior to judgment, typically in jails or pretrial
detention, are presumed innocent; their rights regarding conditions of
confinement arise from their right to not be deprived of life, liberty, or

183. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (“We reject petitioner’s invitation
to adopt an objective test for deliberate indifference. We hold instead that a prison official
cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane
conditions of confinement unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference
could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference. This approach comports best with the text of the Amendment as our cases have
interpreted it. The Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it
outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments.’”).
184. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
185. See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441,
457 (2017).
186. See Andrea Fenster & Margo Schlanger, Slamming the Courthouse Door: 25 Years
of Evidence for Repealing the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Apr.
26, 2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/PLRA_25.html [https://perma.cc/57JWNNL4]; see also Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters
Adulthood, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153 (2015) (showing that nationally only 0.5% of
judgments in plaintiff sided prisoner rights cases are decided pretrial for incarcerated
plaintiffs, only 5.9% settle, and only 0.6% go to trial, 81.6% of prisoner rights cases are
determined pretrial with judgments for the defendants).
187. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 839–40 (“[S]ubjective recklessness as used in the criminal law
is a familiar and workable standard that is consistent with the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause as interpreted in our cases, and we adopt it as the test for ‘deliberate
indifference’ under the Eighth Amendment.”). See generally Rosalie Berger Levinson,
Kingsley Breathes New Life into Substantive Due Process as a Check on Abuse of
Government Power, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 357, 358 (2017) (describing the subjective
state-of-mind requirement of the deliberate indifference test as a “subjective criminal
recklessness” standard requiring “proof that the official acted with malicious, sadistic intent
to harm”). Courts often reason that when an informed prison official attempts any degree of
intervention, even if known to be ineffective at materially reducing the risk of harm, the
intervention constitutes conclusive evidence that the official could not have had the mens
rea required to establish deliberate indifference. See, e.g., Dockery v. Hall, 443 F. Supp. 3d
726, 743–44 (S.D. Miss. 2019) (holding that Department of Corrections officials were not
deliberately indifferent to the risks associated with the indefinite, long-term solitary
confinement of persons with serious mental illness because the prison routinely repaired
damage to cells, “including light fixtures”).
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property absent due process of law,188 as enshrined in the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, if in federal custody, or the Fourteenth
Amendment, if in state or local custody.189 In some jurisdictions, people
held in custody prior to judgment who allege a violation of their rights
under the Due Process Clause due to the conditions of their confinement
must satisfy the onerous Eighth Amendment subjective deliberate
indifference standard; in other jurisdictions, less strict standards may apply,
such as objective unreasonableness or objective deliberate indifference.190
188. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979) (holding that a pretrial detainee has a
right under the Due Process Clause to be free from punishment prior to an adjudication of
guilt).
189. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982). The due process rights of
people held in federal custody arise from the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and
the due process rights of people held in state or local custody arise from the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. V (ratified in 1791 as part of the
Bill of Rights to limit the power and authority of the new U.S. federal government by
requiring that: “No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law”); id. amend. XIV (adopted in 1868 as one of the Reconstruction
Amendments to limit the power and authority of states by requiring that no “State [shall]
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”); see also Bell,
441 U.S. at 554 (addressing the constitutionality of conditions of confinement in a pretrial
federal detention facility and providing that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
protected the federal detainees “against the deprivation of their property without due process
of law”); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) (“Where the State seeks to
impose punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent constitutional guarantee is
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
190. See, e.g., Order on Motions to Dismiss & Application for Injunctive Relief, Baez v.
McDonald, No. 1:20-cv-10753 (D. Mass. May 18, 2020) (denying motion for TRO and
preliminary injunction brought by federal criminal detainees awaiting trial or sentencing on
multiple grounds, including because pre-trial (and post-trial) plaintiffs were not likely to
succeed on the merits as to the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference component, and
explaining that plaintiffs “have not established that they are likely to succeed in showing
that [the defendant] has been obdurate, wonton, or reckless with respect to that risk, or has
otherwise failed to take reasonable steps aimed at preventing or mitigating the risk that
COVID-19 presents to those detained at [the facility]”). In other jurisdictions, pretrial
detainees need not establish subjective deliberate indifference to establish that their rights
under the Due Process Clause were violated. For example, in the Ninth Circuit, an objective
deliberate indifference is applied in the pre-trial detainee context with regards to a claim
related to medical care. See, e.g., Order at 15–16, Lucero-Gonzalez v. Kline, No. 20-cv00901-PHX-DJH (DMF) (D. Ariz. June 2, 2020) (“[C]laims for violations of the right to
adequate medical care brought by pretrial detainees against individual defendants under the
Fourteenth Amendment must be evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference
standard,” and “[t]o state a medical care claim, a pretrial detainee must show (i) the
defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the
plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering
serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that
risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high
degree of risk involved — making the consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious;
and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries.” (citing
Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations
omitted))). See also Carranza v. Reams, No. 20-CV-00977-PAB, 2020 WL 2320174, *7 n.9
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In the Clearinghouse subset of the 70 COVID-19 prison and jail
conditions cases brought in federal court seeking relief affecting multiple
persons, virtually all cases allege violations of the Eighth Amendment, the
Due Process Clause, or both. The vast majority brought claims under the
Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, or both. A handful of cases
in the Clearinghouse subset sought only release and only via writ of habeas
corpus;191 yet to support their habeas corpus petitions, they alleged
unlawful confinement due to rights violations under the Eighth Amendment
and/or Due Process Clause.
A significant majority, approximately two-thirds, of the Clearinghouse
subset cases were not successful in obtaining any form of preliminary
relief. The most common grounds for denial, sometimes cited alongside
alternate sufficient grounds, was the failure to establish a likelihood of
success as to the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard.
Most commonly, courts agreed that plaintiffs were likely to succeed in
establishing the objective prong of the deliberate indifference standard
(substantial risk of serious harm) and the knowledge component of the
subjective prong of the deliberate indifference standard (subjective
knowledge of the risk); however, courts generally disagreed that plaintiffs
were likely to succeed in establishing the “disregard” component of the

(D. Colo. May 11, 2020) for a district court’s explanation of the circuit split on this issue in
one jail COVID-19 case: plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim is brought on behalf of
“persons in carceral custody,” while their Fourteenth Amendment claim is brought on behalf
of pretrial detainees. Although pretrial detainees are protected under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, in the Tenth Circuit,
courts apply “an analysis identical to that applied in Eighth Amendment cases” in
determining whether a pretrial detainee’s rights were violated at the time he was assaulted.
See Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 759 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999). Plaintiffs contend that
Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S 389, 397 (2015), which held that “the appropriate
standard for a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claim is solely an objective one,” changed
the standard for pretrial detainees making deliberate indifference claims. The circuit courts
have split on the applicability of Kingsley to the medical-care context. See Miranda v. Cnty.
of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018) (joining the Second and Ninth Circuits in
concluding that “medical-care claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth
Amendment are subject only to the objective unreasonableness inquiry” but acknowledging
that the Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have confined Kingsley to the excessive-force
context). The Tenth Circuit has declined to rule definitively on the issue. See Burke v.
Regalado, 935 F. 3d 960, 991 n.9 (10th Cir. 2019) (finding that plaintiffs had satisfied their
burden under the Eighth Amendment standard, which is more favorable to defendant, the
court did not need to resolve this issue); see also Perry v. Durborow, 892 F.3d 1116, 1122
n.1 (10th Cir. 2018); Carranza v. Reams, No. 20-cv-00977, 2020 WL 2320174, at *7 n.9 (D.
Colo. May 11, 2020).
191. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2253; see also id. §§ 2254, 2255.
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subjective prong (wanton disregard of the risk by conduct exceeding mere
negligence, failing to take reasonable measures to abate the risk).192
There are critically important exceptions to this general pattern: not all
courts agreed with plaintiffs as to the objective prong (substantial risk of
serious harm). For example, the Fifth Circuit in Valentine v. Collier stayed
the district court’s preliminary injunction because it found defendants were

192. See, e.g., Fernandez-Rodriguez v. Licon-Vitale, 470 F. Supp. 3d 323, 355 (S.D.N.Y.
2020) (denying plaintiffs preliminary relief based on a lack of evidence on the “disregard”
component of subjective deliberate indifference, finding a substantial risk to the health of
residents due to defendants’ lack of a sick-call system, lack of symptom screening in
quarantine, lack of contact tracing, lack of following their own COVID-19 safety protocols,
failure to provide testing or care to people with COVID-19 symptoms, and lack of attempts
to use population reduction measures available to them); Order on Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order at 1, 48–49, 49 n.10, Denbow v. Me. Dept. of Corr., No. 1:20-cv-00175
(D. Me. June 8, 2020) (denying plaintiffs motion for a TRO because “significant unresolved
factual disputes preclude a finding that the incarcerated individuals have established a
likelihood of success on the merits” of the Eighth Amendment and ADA and RA claims,
including because the record before the court at the TRO stage did not “support a finding of
the sort of ‘wanton disregard’ necessary to establish deliberate indifference”); Order at 14–
15, Lucero-Gonzalez v. Kline, No. 20-cv-00901-PHX-DJH (DMF) (D. Ariz. June 2, 2020)
(denying plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction because defendants, as to
the post-conviction plaintiff, “have enacted various policies in response to the risks posed by
COVID-19,” and without a significant analysis of adequacy, “[t]he very fact that
Defendants have enacted such policies supports that they have not been subjectively
indifferent to the risks posed by COVID-19 to Plaintiffs” (emphasis added)); Ruling at 30,
34, Gumns v. Edwards, No. 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB (M.D. La. May 15, 2020) (denying
plaintiffs motion for a TRO on multiple grounds, including plaintiffs’ inability to satisfy the
subjective deliberate indifference standard and extensively citing to the Fifth Circuit’s
decision to stay the preliminary injunction in Valentine v. Collier: “For the same reasons
articulated in Amos and Valentine, the Court finds that, while the Camp J transfer and
isolation plan is not a ‘perfect’ plan, the well-intentioned efforts to decrease the risk of harm
and the spread of the coronavirus throughout Louisiana jails and prisons belies a claim of
deliberate indifference”); Opinion & Order at 4, 12–17, 41–42, Money v. Brown, No. 20-cv00570-SB (D. Or. Apr. 6, 2020) (discussing a range of facts that preclude a finding of
deliberate indifference, including because defendant developed and implemented COVID19 policies, protective equipment, suspended visitation, provided free soap, established
respiratory clinics, and conducted asymptomatic testing and contact tracing; the court
disagreed with plaintiffs that the lack of release measures could support a finding of
deliberate indifference, since “[a]t this juncture, neither [defendant’s] nor this Court’s pen
can reduce the prison population to save lives,” because “[o]nly the Governor has that
power”); Order at 24, 31–32, Jones v. Hill, No. 1:20-cv-02791-JPB (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24,
2020) (applying the Eighth Amendment standard in a jail case and denying a preliminary
injunction because of a failure to establish success as to the second half of the subjective
prong of the deliberate indifference standard: “the Court finds that Plaintiffs are likely to
show both the objective component (substantial risk of serious harm) necessary to establish
a deliberate indifference claim and that Defendants had subjective knowledge of that harm,”
however, given conflicting evidence available at the preliminary injunction stage of the
proceedings, “this Court is not persuaded Plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that
Defendants disregarded the risk of serious harm by conduct more than mere negligence.
Without this showing, Plaintiffs cannot establish a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits”).
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likely to prevail on the merits for two main reasons: (1) the plaintiffs lacked
evidence that “a substantial risk of serious harm” existed after accounting
for the protective measure defendants had taken; and (2) the plaintiffs
lacked evidence as to defendants’ subjective deliberate indifference,
assuming the requisite risk did exist.193 Other courts followed suit, citing
to the Valentine stay order to find a lack of evidence as to the objective
prong of the deliberate indifference standard (substantial risk of serious
harm) and inadequate evidence showing defendants were subjectively
deliberately indifferent.194
A small minority of cases were successful in obtaining preliminary
injunctive relief based on a finding that they were likely to successfully
establish that defendants’ conduct amounted to subjective deliberate
indifference.195

193. Valentine I, 956 F.3d 797, 806 (5th Cir. 2020) (granting stay of preliminary
injunction).
194. See, e.g., Order & Report-Recommendation at 17–18, Harper v. Cuomo, No. 21-cv0019 (N.D.N.Y Mar. 1, 2021) (concluding that “the relevant inquiry is whether Plaintiffs
have shown a substantial risk of serious harm from COVID-19 at Adirondack in light of the
countermeasures that the facility has in place to mitigate the risk of harm,” and finding a
lack of evidence to support it exists because “Adirondack’s response to COVID-19 has been
aggressive” and includes dining hall social distancing, provision of hand sanitizer, random
asymptomatic testing, additional cleaning supplies, distribution of masks and required
masking out of cells, transfer restrictions, making sick staff stay home, designation of two
isolation rooms); Chunn v. Edge, 465 F. Supp. 3d 168, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (denying
plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, citing the stay order in Valentine for the rule
and determining: “the relevant inquiry is whether petitioners have shown a substantial risk
of serious harm from COVID-19 at the MDC in light of the countermeasures that the facility
has in place,” and plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed in making that showing because
defendants’ “response to COVID-19 has been aggressive and has included, among other
steps, massively restricting movement within the facility, enhancing sanitation protocols,
and creating quarantine and isolation units.”). But see Fernandez-Rodriguez, 470 F. Supp.
3d at 350–55 (finding that “[t]he record shows, with the above guidelines in mind, that the
conditions in the MCC — despite the MCC’s attempts at protective measures — posed a
substantial risk to the health of its inmates” because of its lack of a sick-call system, lack of
symptom screening in quarantine, lack of contact tracing, lack of following their own
COVID-19 safety protocols, failure to provide testing or care to people with COVID-19
symptoms, and lack of attempts to use population reduction measures available to them;
nevertheless denying plaintiffs preliminary relief based on a lack of evidence on the
“disregard” component of subjective deliberate indifference).
195. See, e.g., Savino v. Souza, 459 F. Supp. 3d 317, 321 (D. Mass. 2020) (finding “the
government’s response likely amounts to deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm to detainees’ health,” due to facts including “the government’s near-blanket
opposition to the release of detainees throughout the bail process,” and “its minimal efforts
at testing and contact tracing”); Ruling on Motion for Temporary Restraining Order &
Motion to Dismiss at 2, 47, 50–51, 64, Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, No. 3:20-cv-000569
(MPS) (D. Conn. May 12, 2020) (finding that a number of defendants’ failures support a
finding of deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to prison residents,
including the failure to use population reduction tools at defendants’ disposal to place
medically vulnerable residents on home confinement or to release them via compassionate
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In Valentine v. Collier, plaintiffs living in a state geriatric prison sought
a preliminary injunction mandating COVID-19 mitigation measures, and
the court issued a preliminary injunction.196 It never went into effect. The
Fifth Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction pending completion of
appellate review, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied plaintiffs’ emergency
application to vacate the Fifth Circuit’s stay.197 The Fifth Circuit stayed
the preliminary injunction because the defendants were likely to prevail on
the merits for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs had not accounted for the
protective measures the defendants had taken when assessing whether a
substantial risk of serious harm existed that amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment. Second, the district court committed legal error in applying
Eighth Amendment law because defendants had taken and were taking
mitigation measures to control the spread of COVID-19, and plaintiffs
lacked evidence of defendants’ subjective deliberate indifference to a
substantial risk of serious harm, assuming it existed.
The Fifth Circuit granted defendant’s interlocutory appeal to vacate the
preliminary injunction and remanded the proceedings to the district
court.198 The district court granted plaintiffs’ request for a permanent
injunction, defendants appealed, and the Fifth Circuit stayed the permanent
injunction pending an appeal.199 The U.S. Supreme Court denied two
individuals’ applications to vacate the Fifth Circuit’s stay of the permanent

release under Section 3582(c)(1)(A)); Order at 18 n.9, 25–26, 37, Carranza v. Reams, No.
20-cv-00977-PAB (D. Colo. Apr. 7, 2020) (finding that pre-adjudication plaintiffs in a jail
had satisfied the more difficult Eighth Amendment standard but declined to resolve the
dispute about what standard ought to apply; granting in part plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO
and preliminary injunction; finding plaintiffs were likely to succeed in establishing
deliberate indifference, including because defendants failed to take specific social distancing
and sanitation precautions to protect medically vulnerable residents).
196. See Preliminary Injunction Order at 2, Valentine v. Collier, No. 20-cv-01115 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 16, 2020) (granting preliminary injunction).
197. See Valentine I, 956 F.3d 797, 806 (5th Cir. 2020) (granting stay of preliminary
injunction, finding that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed because they did not comply with
the PLRA’s administrative exhaustion requirement and, in any event, their Eighth
Amendment claim was likely to fail on the merits); see also Valentine v. Collier (Valentine
II), 140 S. Ct. 1598, 1598 (2020) (mem.) (denying emergency application to vacate stay).
198. See Valentine v. Collier (Valentine III), 960 F.3d 707, 707 (5th Cir. 2020) (per
curiam) (vacating preliminary injunction and remanding to district court for further
proceedings on the permanent injunction; consists of three separate concurring opinions
with differing views on the merits of the preliminary injunction).
199. See Valentine v. Collier, 490 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1175 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (granting
permanent injunction); see also Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154, 166 (5th Cir. 2020)
(granting stay of permanent injunction pending appeal).
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injunction.200 One year after the case was filed, the Fifth Circuit reversed
the permanent injunction and rendered judgment for the defendants.201
As to the Eighth Amendment claim, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the
district court had erred by accepting that defendants had acted with
deliberate indifference because it was not unreasonable for officials to rely
on policies created by healthcare experts, and because defendants
implemented COVID-19 mitigation measures, some of which the court
called “far from perfect.”202 The court determined that the plaintiffs did not
show actual success on the merits of their disability rights claims under the
ADA and RA.203
The Fifth Circuit’s opinion granting a stay of the preliminary injunction
in Valentine was issued in the Spring of 2020 when a high volume of
COVID-19 jail and prison conditions cases were being filed and litigated
across the country; it had an immediate impact on similar pending cases.204
These impacts, along with the impact of the Fifth Circuit’s subsequent
opinion vacating the permanent injunction in Valentine,205 strongly suggest

200. See Valentine v. Collier, 141 S. Ct. 57, 57 (2020) (mem.) (denying application to
vacate stay).
201. See Valentine v. Collier, 993 F.3d 270, 291 (5th Cir. 2021) (reversing judgment,
vacating the permanent injunction, and entering judgment for defendants).
202. Id. at 283, 284, 286, 287–89; see also id. at 288 (“[Defendants’] response to
COVID-19 in the crowded dormitories of the Pack Unit was far from perfect,” yet, “[t]he
same can be said for the response in most communities in the free world. Knowledge about
the disease and how to combat it evolved over the nine months of this litigation.”).
203. See id. at 290–91.
204. See supra note 194; see also, e.g., Marlowe v. Leblanc, 810 F. App’x 302, 303 (5th
Cir. 2020) (staying a preliminary injunction regarding COVID-19 mitigation issued by a
district court in Louisiana to protect litigants in Louisiana prisons and citing the Fifth
Circuit’s stay of preliminary relief in Valentine v. Collier); Ruling at 30, 34, Gumns v.
Edwards, No. 3:20-cv-00231-SDD-RLB (M.D. La. Apr. 14, 2020) (“For the same reasons
articulated in Amos and Valentine, the Court finds that, while the Camp J transfer and
isolation plan is not a ‘perfect’ plan, the well-intentioned efforts to decrease the risk of harm
and the spread of the coronavirus throughout Louisiana jails and prisons belies a claim of
deliberate indifference.”).
205. Along with vacating the permanent injunction, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
judgment in the case. While an injunction is forward looking, a court’s judgment on the
merits of a decision governs whether attorneys can recover attorney’s fees and litigation
costs under the civil rights statutes for having won a case on the merits. The Fifth Circuit’s
decision provided: “We are firmly convinced that this litigation generally and the district
court’s careful management and expedited handling of the case played a role in motivating
the prison officials into action and saved countless lives. Injunctive relief is forward
looking, and given the Defendants’ response, including actions taken on the eve of and
during trial, the permanent injunction is not warranted.” Valentine, 993 F.3d at 289. Though
plaintiffs have “saved countless lives” through the litigating their case, they (1) cannot
recoup attorney’s fees and litigation costs under Section 1988 as the non-prevailing party;
and (2) may also be required to pay defendant’s litigation costs under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 54 as the non-prevailing party. This disturbing logic underscores how illsuited the deliberate indifference standard is for keeping people in jail and prisons from
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that Valentine and similar court of appeals decisions in the Sixth and
Eleventh circuits vacating preliminary relief due to lack of evidence of
defendants’ deliberate indifference will be a bulwark against the success of
future climate-related prison and jail conditions litigants.206
ii. The Federal Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Non-Discrimination
Persons with disabilities are dramatically overrepresented in prisons,
jails, and detention centers. According to reports published by the DOJ’s
Bureau of Justice Statistics, federal and state prisoners were between two
and a half and three times more likely than adults in the general U.S.
population to report having at least one disability.207 While the prevalence

unnecessary death: litigation can prompt defendants to take steps that save countless lives,
but no judgment or injunction shall issue on their side because defendants took steps to save
lives because of the litigation. “When there is a possible constitutional violation that is
likely to continue over time as in a prison injunction case,” the court must “consider the
evidence from the time suit is filed to the judgment,” as “[d]eliberate indifference is
determined based on prison officials’ current attitudes and conduct,” and “[t]he evidence
must show over the course of the timeline” that officials (1) “knowingly and unreasonably
disregard[ed] an objectively intolerable risk of harm,” (2) “that they will continue to do so,”
and (3) to establish eligibility for an injunction, the inmate must demonstrate the
continuance of that disregard during the remainder of the litigation and into the future.” Id.
at 282 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added) (reversing judgment in favor of
defendants). Even if the requirements for an injunction cannot be satisfied at the time of
judgment, courts should consider whether they may nonetheless issue declaratory judgment
in favor of plaintiffs if constitutional violations existed at the time of filing or thereafter. The
perverse effect of marrying the deliberate indifference standard to the injunctive relief
standard has led to disturbing outcomes. In one district court decision, upheld by the Fifth
Circuit, plaintiffs whose Eighth Amendment rights may well have been violated by
defendants at and during the time of suit, according to the court, were nonetheless required
to pay defendants’ fees and costs under Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
because the court did not, and was not required to, make a finding at the time of judgment
on whether plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment rights were violated at the time of or during suit,
since prison officials had also taken corrective steps by the time of judgment (and so were
found not to be deliberately indifferent). See Dockery v. Hall, 443 F. Supp. 3d 726 (S.D.
Miss. 2019).
206. Valentine III, 960 F.3d 707, 707 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (vacating preliminary
injunction); see also Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020) (vacating the
preliminary injunction); Cameron v. Bouchard, 815 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2020) (vacating
preliminary injunction); Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2020) (“We simply
cannot conclude that, when faced with a perfect storm of a contagious virus and the space
constraints inherent in a correctional facility, the defendants here acted unreasonably by
‘doing their best.’”); Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1089 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam)
(vacating preliminary injunction).
207. See LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, JENNIFER BRONSON & MARIEL ALPER, BUREAU OF JUST.
STAT., NCJ 252642, DISABILITIES REPORTED BY PRISONERS: SURVEY OF PRISON INMATES,
2016 (2021), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/drpspi16st.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX7MHS47] (reporting that state and federal prison residents were about two and a half times
more likely (38%) to report a disability than adults in the U.S. general population (15%)
based on findings based on data collected in the 2016 Survey of Prison Inmates, a survey
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of disability among the U.S. general population is 15%, the statistics are
higher among state prison residents: in state prisons, more than half (57%)
of residents ages 55 to 64 reported having a disability, and 7 in 10 (70%)
age 65 or older reported a disability.208
Prison conditions suits, including many brought on behalf of imprisoned
people during the COVID-19 pandemic, often include statutory claims
brought under Title II of the ADA and pursuant to the regulations
implementing Title II of the ADA in Section 504 of the RA.209 Claims
under the ADA and RA are both analyzed using the same legal
standards.210 Both prohibit disability-based discrimination. Both also
“impose upon public entities an affirmative obligation to make reasonable
accommodations for disabled individuals.”211 While the same conduct that
violates the Eighth Amendment may also violate Title II of the ADA, the
Supreme Court recognizes that “Title II prohibits ‘a somewhat broader
swath of conduct’ than what the Constitution itself forbids.”212

conducted through face-to-face interviews with a national sample of thousands of state and
federal prison residents); see also JENNIFER BRONSON, LAURA M. MARUSCHAK & MARCUS
BERZOFSKY, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., NCJ 249151, DISABILITIES AMONG PRISON AND JAIL
INMATES,
2011–12
(2015),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/dpji1112.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z3DB-YFRW] (reporting that state and federal prison residents were
almost three times more likely to report a disability than adults in the U.S. general
population based on a national survey of almost 40,000 prisoners housed in over 200 state
and federal prisons, including at least one facility located in each state).
208. See MARUSCHAK ET AL., supra note 207.
209. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111; see also 29 U.S.C. § 701.
210. See Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2020) (“The remedies,
procedures, and rights available under the Rehabilitation Act parallel those available under
the ADA . . . . Thus, jurisprudence interpreting either section is applicable to both.”
(citations and internal punctuation omitted)); see also Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d
215, 223 (5th Cir. 2011); Borum v. Swisher Cnty., No. 14-cv-127-J, 2015 WL 327508, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2015). Consequently, discussion of the legal standards applicable to the
ADA and RA in the prison conditions context typically apply to ADA and RA claims alike,
so long as the prison in question received any federal funding. The Rehabilitation Act “is
operationally identical to the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) in that both
statutes prohibit discrimination against disabled persons; however, the ADA applies only to
public entities while the [Rehabilitation Act] applies to any federally funded programs or
activities, whether public or private.” Borum, 2015 WL 327508, at *3 (citing Kemp v.
Holder, 610 F.3d 231, 234 (5th Cir. 2010)). State prisons often receive federal funding. See,
e.g., Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1308 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that the federal
government has a substantial interest in providing federal funds to state prisons to protect
the federal civil rights of incarcerated people); Jerry Mitchell, Broken Promises and Lost
Funding: How Mississippi Reform Failed, GUARDIAN (May 9, 2019, 6:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/may/09/mississippi-prison-reform-failed-firststep-act [https://perma.cc/4XKY-A93C].
211. Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 454 (5th Cir. 2005).
212. See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157, 160 (2006) (citing Tennessee v.
Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533 n.24 (2004)).
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Under these laws, public entities must “make reasonable modifications
in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary
to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability,”213 and prohibited
discrimination occurs when an entity fails to make reasonable
modifications that would allow a person with a disability to participate in a
service, program, or activity,214 which include the provision of medical
care.215 The cause of any failure to do so is not relevant to the liability
analysis.216
However, defendants are not required to undertake
unreasonable modifications.217
In the Clearinghouse subset of 70 COVID-19 prison and jail conditions
cases brought in federal court seeking relief affecting multiple persons,
approximately a quarter of all cases included disability rights claims under
the ADA and RA. In general, plaintiffs in the Clearinghouse subset were
not successful in obtaining preliminary relief based on such claims.218
Some courts explicitly ruled that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the

213. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1998).
214. The ADA and the RA apply to “all of the operations” of a public entity. Frame, 657
F.3d at 225. Other courts have similarly construed the “services, programs, or activities”
language in the ADA to encompass “anything a public entity does.” See, e.g., Bahl v. Cnty.
of Ramsey, 695 F.3d 778, 787 (8th Cir. 2012); Barden v. City of Sacramento, 292 F.3d
1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 2002); Yeskey v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 118 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1997),
aff’d, 524 U.S. 206 (1998). Department of Justice regulations provide that “Title II applies
to anything a public entity does.” Seremeth v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs Frederick Cty., 673
F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35, App. B); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101485(II) (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 367 (stating that Title II is intended to
apply to “all actions of state and local governments”).
215. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i) (2021).
216. See, e.g., Bennett-Nelson, 431 F.3d at 454–55 (“In addition to their respective
prohibitions of disability-based discrimination . . . [w]here a defendant fails to meet this
affirmative obligation, the cause of that failure is irrelevant.” (citing Title II of the ADA)).
217. The requested modifications must be reasonable, “meaning that [they do] not impose
undue financial or administrative burdens or ‘fundamentally alter the nature of the service,
program, or activity.’” Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing 28
C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i) (2020)). Note that state departments of corrections have a
constitutional obligation to provide for the medical care and reasonable safety of its inmates.
See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993). Accordingly, accommodations required
to facilitate provision of medical care and ensure reasonable safety cannot constitute a
fundamental alteration or undue burden for purposes of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act.
218. While not a case within the Clearinghouse subset, the plaintiffs in Armstrong v.
Newsom, No. 94-cv-02307-CW (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2021), obtained COVID-19 mitigation
measures and court expert monitoring of such measures through the longstanding consent
decree in the case, which was brought under the ADA and RA and represents a class of all
prison residents with disabilities within the California prison system. See, e.g., Court
Expert’s Fifth Report and Recommendations Regarding Housing of Armstrong Class
Members during the COVID-19 Pandemic, Armstrong, No. 94-cv-02307-CW (N.D. Cal.
June 2, 2021) (providing a status update on mitigation measures and vaccination programs
and commending the parties “for the collaborative and productive work they have done to
address the needs of class members during the COVID-19 pandemic”).
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merits of their ADA or RA claims.219 Other courts have not or did not rule
on the likelihood of success on the ADA or RA claims in resolving motions
for preliminary relief.220
In Frazier v. Kelley, for example, a federal district court in Arkansas
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of
success in establishing any of the elements required to show discrimination
under the ADA.221 The court assumed, arguendo, that the proposed
plaintiff subclass were all qualified individuals with a disability, which was

219. See, e.g., Frazier v. Kelley, 460 F. Supp. 3d 799, 829 (E.D. Ark. 2020); Money v.
Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1132–33, 1133 n.14 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (concluding after
analysis that plaintiffs “have no plausible allegations that ADA-qualified inmates have been
discriminated against because of their disabilities,” and that plaintiffs have no reasonable
likelihood of success “under any of the three ways establishing an ADA discrimination
claim,” which are “(1) the defendant intentionally acted on the basis of the disability, (2) the
defendant refused to provide a reasonable modification, or (3) the defendant’s rule
disproportionally impacts disabled people” (citing Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic
Ass’n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 847 (7th Cir. 1999)); Denbow v. Me. Dep’t of Corr., No. 20-cv00175, 2020 WL 3052220, at *24 (D. Me. June 8, 2020); see also Harper v. Cuomo, No. 21cv-00019, 2021 WL 1821362, at *15 (N.D.N.Y Mar. 1, 2021) (finding after lengthy analysis
that plaintiffs had not demonstrated a clear likelihood of success on their ADA and RA
claims in a non-binding magistrate report and recommendation which was followed by
plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal of suit).
220. See, e.g., Jones v. Hill, No. 1:20-cv-02791-JPB (N.D. Ga. Dec. 24, 2020) (wherein
plaintiffs brought ADA and RA claims (ECF No. 1), moved for a preliminary injunction on
behalf of a disability subclass under ADA and RA claims (ECF No. 19), but following
discovery and a hearing, “only the deliberate indifference claim remains,” (ECF No. 128 at
8); the court denied a preliminary injunction because of a failure to show a likelihood of
success on the deliberate indifference element of their Eighth Amendment (ECF No. 128));
Notice of Withdrawal of Motion, Waddell v. Taylor, No. 20-cv-00340-TSL-RHW (S.D.
Miss. Sept. 15, 2020) (plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their motion for a TRO and
preliminary injuction (ECF No. 12) and the court granted a joint motion to stay proceedings
pending negotiations (ECF No. 14)). But see Valentine I, 956 F.3d 797, 806–07 (5th Cir.
2020) (Higginson, J., concurring) (concurring on the grounds that defendants were likely to
succeed on their claim that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the
PLRA and explaining, “I would not reach the merits of Appellees’ ADA and 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claims,” because “[w]hereas those claims face high legal hurdles, they also are
intensely fact-based,” and “[t]he district court assessed lay and expert testimony before
making extensive and careful findings of fact showing that mitigation deficiencies still
exist”; therefore, “given the [Texas Department of Criminal Justice’s] systemic and ongoing
responses to fast-changing guidance, I would reserve for the merits panel the complex
question of whether and which of these deficiencies amount to a cognizable violation.”).
221. 460 F. Supp. 3d at 843–44. To show discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must
prove:
(1) that he is a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA; (2) that he is
being excluded from participation in, or being denied benefits of, services,
programs, or activities for which the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise
being discriminated against by the public entity; and (3) that such exclusion,
denial of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of his disability.
Smith v. Harris Cnty., 956 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Melton v. Dall. Area
Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 671–72 (5th Cir. 2004)).
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in dispute, but concluded that the plaintiffs (a) were not likely to
successfully claim that defendants’ action or inaction had the effect of
denying plaintiffs “‘the benefits of the services, programs, or activities’
within [the prison] ‘by reason of’ those plaintiffs’ disabilities,” (b) were not
likely to claim successfully that any “reasonable accommodations have
been denied for plaintiffs in the proposed disability subclass”; and (c) were
not likely to claim successfully that, “to the extent plaintiffs requested and
were denied reasonable accommodations,” the “defendants denied those
requests because of plaintiffs’ alleged disabilities.”222
The Fifth Circuit gave the plaintiffs substantially more credit in their
2021 decision in Valentine v. Collier to vacate the permanent injunction
and enter final judgment for the defendants.223 Notably, the court
determined that the plaintiffs had not succeeded on the merits of their
disability rights claims under the ADA and RA, but that they had satisfied
two of the three prongs of the ADA discrimination test: (1) being qualified
individuals under the ADA, and (2) being excluded from “participation in,
or being denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for which the
public entity is responsible, or is otherwise being discriminated against by
the public entity.”224 As to the latter, the court explained that “the prison
provided a heightened hand hygiene service to inmates to combat the
virus,” and that “in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, wheelchair and
walker-bound inmates did not have equal access to the benefits of the
heightened hand hygiene service provided by the prison through the
additional soap and handwashing stations.”225 The court found that the
plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the third prong of the prima facie case, that of
discrimination by reason of disability. The court agreed that plaintiffs had
a unique disability-based need for supplemented hand hygiene supplies, but
the court found that (a) the plaintiffs’ need was not open and obvious, and
(b) that plaintiffs had failed to “inform[] [defendants] of their unique

222. Frazier, 460 F. Supp. 3d at 843–44 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132).
223. See 993 F.3d 270, 290–91 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Plaintiffs did not show actual success on
the merits of their ADA claim. We therefore vacate the district court’s injunction as it
pertains to hand sanitizers.”).
224. Id. at 289 (discussing that “[the court] has recognized that prison ‘services,
programs, or activities’ include recreational services, medical services, and vocational
programs,” and that “[t]he Supreme Court has stated that a failure to accommodate ‘such
fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and virtually all other prison programs
constitute[s] . . . denial of the benefits of the prison’s ‘services, programs, or activities.’”
(quoting Smith v. Harris Cty., 956 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2020) then quoting United States
v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 157 (2006))).
225. Id. at 289–90.
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inability to keep their hands clean” and request the accommodation — that
hand sanitizer be provided to wheelchair users.226
Plaintiffs’ overall lack of success in obtaining preliminary relief on
disability rights claims suggests that prison and jail residents with
disabilities who are threatened by climate-related harms should consider
bringing additional conditions claims, if relevant, in suits to protect their
rights. It also suggests that ADA and RA claims, though intensely factspecific claims, may not provide a reliable path towards obtaining
preliminary relief or avoiding the Eighth Amendment’s deliberate
indifference standard.
iii. Class-Wide Petition for Habeas Corpus Seeking Relief from Unlawful
Conditions of Confinement
Approximately half of all 70 cases in the Clearinghouse subset include
some form of a class-wide petition for habeas corpus,227 which in a
minority of circuits may be granted upon proof that the conditions of the
petitioner’s confinement violate his or her federal rights.228 In nearly all of
these, the petitioners assert Eighth Amendment violations as the basis for
their petition. The availability of habeas corpus to challenge conditions of
confinement was left open by the U.S. Supreme Court, and there is a circuit
split on the question.229

226. Id. at 290–91.
227. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2255.
228. A writ of habeas corpus extends to prisoners who are held in federal or state custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States. Id. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2245.
Traditionally, the function of the writ of habeas corpus is to trigger release of a person
confined by the government absent legal authority — in other words, to challenge the fact or
duration of one’s confinement and seek release from it. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74, 78 (2005); Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005)
(providing that a federal prisoner may challenge the fact, duration or execution of his or her
sentence in a petition for habeas corpus under Section 2241).
229. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499–500 (1973) (“This is not to say that
habeas corpus may not also be available to challenge [unconstitutional] prison conditions.”);
see also Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (stating conditions claims
may be brought in the habeas corpus context); United States v. DeLeon, 444 F.3d 41, 59 (1st
Cir. 2006) (“If the conditions of incarceration raise Eighth Amendment concerns, habeas
corpus is available.”); Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146–47 (2d Cir. 2001) (conditions
claims may be brought in the habeas corpus context). Compare Spencer v. Haynes, 774 F.3d
467, 470 n.6 (8th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases and concluding that “[t]he D.C. Circuit, the
Second Circuit, the Third Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the Sixth Circuit firmly stand in
the camp of allowing conditions-of-confinement claims to be brought in the habeas corpus
context, with the First Circuit contributing dictum to this view”), with Wilborn v.
Mansukhani, 795 F. App’x 157, 163–64 (4th Cir. 2019) (holding that challenges to
conditions of confinement cannot be brought as a habeas petition).
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In the most general terms, all petitioners sought some form of release,
though as previously noted, the word “release” was usually not the
applicable term of art. The relief requested varied widely but generally
incorporated a request for temporary or permanent release or transfer to a
place where social distancing was possible, including into the community,
unconditionally or conditionally, or to a residence, via home confinement
or house arrest. Some class-wide petitions also sought release pending
adjudication of the petitions, framed as requests for temporary enlargement
of custody or bail pending habeas corpus. Some sought court orders to
expedite the use of programs or procedures through which defendants had
pre-existing authority to modify certain custodial terms, including to
effectuate transfers out of the facility and into the community. 230
Of the approximately half of all subset cases that sought some form of
release as preliminary relief pursuant to a habeas corpus claim, most were
unsuccessful. There were five main grounds for denial: (1) petitions for
habeas corpus cannot be brought to cure unlawful conditions of
confinement; (2) conditions-based habeas petitions are cognizable, but the
plaintiffs failed to prove or establish a likelihood of success as to the
underlying conditions-related claim (usually due to a lack of evidence of
subjective deliberate indifference); (3) conditions-based habeas was
available, in fact or arguendo, but only in extreme cases where no possible
set of confinement conditions could cure the violation, and the case did not
qualify (and therefore the PLRA exhaustion and prisoner release order
requirements apply);231 and (4) regardless of availability, the court
dismissed the petition due to petitioners’ failure to exhaust applicable state
remedies.232 As to the latter, post-trial petitioners must exhaust available

230. See generally Order on Motions to Dismiss & Application for Injunctive Relief at 2–
5, Baez v. Moniz, No. 20-cv-10753-LTS (D. Mass. May 18, 2020) (denying defendant’s
motion to dismiss based on the unavailability of habeas to cure conditions and finding the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement does not apply to conditions-based habeas petitions: “in the
extraordinary circumstances presented by the COVID-19 pandemic,” along with petitioners’
claim that release is the only means of protecting them from unconstitutional treatment, “the
Court finds that the petitioners’ claims sound in habeas, and this Court has jurisdiction to
consider them under § 2241”; describing conditions-based habeas corpus petitions as
“present[ing] hybrid challenges aimed both at the conditions of confinement and at the
ultimate fact or level of confinement are difficult to classify, as they are neither traditional
or ‘core’ habeas claims nor straightforward conditions cases arising under 42 U.S.C. §
1983”); Money v. Pritzker, 453 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1119 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (describing the
“thick and tangled web” of statutes and case law defining the availability and scope of
conditions-based habeas corpus petitions, which arise at “the intersection of habeas and civil
rights claims” (internal quotations omitted)).
231. See infra Section II.E (discussing PLRA).
232. See, e.g., infra Section II.E (discussing PLRA); Denbow v. Me. Dep’t. of Corr., No.
20-cv-00175, 2020 WL 4736462, at *13 (D. Me. Aug. 14, 2020); Grinis v. Spaulding, No.
20-cv-10738, 2020 WL 3097360, at *4 (D. Mass. June 11, 2020) (finding conditions-based
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state court remedies as a prerequisite for a federal court to consider a
challenge to state detention, though courts may excuse non-exhaustion.233
Of the handful of conditions-based habeas petitions that were successful,
they were limited to a few district courts.234
Based on these observations about the outcomes of conditions-based
habeas petitions in the Clearinghouse subset, future plaintiffs in climaterelated conditions litigation may wish to bring class-wide habeas petitions

habeas not cognizable in a scathing opinion: “[Petitioners] themselves say they do not
necessarily want to be released, a very odd thing for habeas petitioners to say. This action is
thus revealed as a false flag operation. Flying the banner of habeas corpus, it is nevertheless
in substance a ‘civil action with respect to prison conditions’ that seeks the entry of a
‘prisoner release order’ as those terms are defined in the PLRA”); Wragg v. Ortiz, 462 F.
Supp. 3d 476, 502 (D.N.J. 2020) (“Because Petitioners cannot show that the mitigated
health risk at FCI Fort Dix is ‘so grave’ that it would ‘violate[] contemporary standards of
decency to expose anyone unwillingly to’ it, habeas jurisdiction does not lie.” (quoting
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993))); Seth v. McDonough, 461 F. Supp. 3d 242,
256–57 (D. Md. 2020) (concluding that the plaintiffs claim, “at its core, is a challenge to
prison conditions,” and while a “dual designation” conditions-based habeas petition “may
make sense in other contexts,” the court is “not prepared to conclude that the challenge
concerns both the fact and the conditions of confinement”); Hallinan v. Scarantino, 466 F.
Supp. 3d 587, 602 (E.D.N.C. 2020) (“[A]lthough there ‘may ultimately be an area of limited
substantive overlap between . . . habeas corpus and § 1983,’ petitioners have failed to
establish that their paradigmatic conditions of confinement claims qualify for such special
treatment and therefore are cognizable habeas claims.” (citing Lee v. Winston, 717 F.2d
888, 892 (4th Cir. 1983))).
233. See, e.g., Montano v. Texas, 867 F.3d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 2017); Dickerson v.
Louisiana., 816 F.2d 220, 225 (5th Cir. 1987).
234. These include federal district courts in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and California,
which fall within the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits, respectively. See, e.g., Savino v.
Souza, 459 F. Supp. 3d 317, 320 (D. Mass. 2020) (explaining that “[t]he Court has matched
the unusual health emergency with an unusual procedural maneuver,” and that “[b]efore
addressing the merits of the petition, the Court relied on its inherent authority expeditiously
to review bail applications for all of the detainees in the class, one by one, and released
almost a third of them to house arrest under strict conditions”; the Court continued: “These
releases have meaningfully reduced the crowding at the detention center and, one hopes,
hindered the virus’ spread”); see also Order re: Plaintiff-Petitioners’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, & Ex Parte Application for Provisional Class Certification at 48–50, Torres v.
Milusnic, No. 20-4450-CBM-PVC(x) (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2020) (ordering, along with other
relief, BOP to institute a process through which it must consider people over the age of 50
for home confinement if they have at least one health condition that puts them at risk of
serious illness from COVID-19); Ruling on Motion for TRO & Moion. to Dismiss at 2, 29–
30, 33–36, 60, 68, Martinez-Brooks v. Easter, No. 3:20-cv-000569 (MPS) (D. Conn. May
12, 2020) (ordering the federal prison defendants to implement “a process by which inmates
would be evaluated promptly for transfer to home confinement,” mandating “individualized
consideration . . . on a basis more accelerated and more focused on the critical factors of
inmate and public safety than the current home confinement review process,” and explicitly
holding that the Order (1) does not divest the BOP of its sentencing authority or its statutory
and regulatory discretion, but “merely directs the Respondents to exercise the authority
already conferred on them to place inmates in home confinement and consider requests for
compassionate release in a manner that does not violate the Eighth Amendment” and (2)
does not run afoul of the PLRA, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, res judicata, or claim preclusion).
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for release with the understanding that success rates may be low because
many jurisdictions have not yet recognized habeas corpus as a vehicle by
which a court may order a jail or prison to relocate a resident in order to
cure an unlawful condition of confinement. However, a few courts that
denied relief to petitioners seeking escape from COVID-19-related dangers
left open the possibility that future conditions-based habeas petitions may
prevail if unlawful conditions of confinement were inextricably bound to
the fact of confinement, in other words, if no version of possible jail or
prison conditions could remedy the violation.235
Certain types of emergent climate-change-related crises could
potentially satisfy this requirement and obtain a form of release as relief,
but not likely on a preliminary, or pre-harm, basis. In other words, for the
holdout courts, the ideal complete merger of conditions-of-confinement
with fact-of-confinement presupposes that extensive damage has already
been done. By applying this reasoning to past climate-related crises,
certain limitations of this perfect merger requirement become clear. For
example, in the days before Hurricane Katrina hit, the Orleans Parish
Prison sheriff refused to evacuate the jail residents, which included
children, despite the New Orleans’s Mayor having declared a mandatory
city-wide evacuation and widespread doubt that the levees would hold.236
When the storm hit and floodwaters entered the facility, many sheriff’s
deputies left their posts and left people locked inside their cells; some
flooded to chest height, for days, without food, clean water, or
ventilation.237 Applying the reasoning of Clearinghouse subset cases that
denied conditions-based habeas relief but recognized its availability,
hypothetical petitioners in the Orleans Parish Prison would likely only
qualify for relief once locked in their flooded cells. Hypothetically, if a
facility were in the undisputed path of a nearing megafire or volcanic
eruption, maybe pre-harm relief could be obtained under the exacting
standard discussed in jurisdictions where the availability of habeas to cure
an illegal condition of confinement remains undecided. Regardless, in such
courts, class-wide petitions should be brought, but not relied upon,
particularly if residents face emergent, life-threatening climate-related
conditions.

235. See, e.g., Wragg, 462 F. Supp. 3d at 505; Hallinan, 466 F. Supp. 3d at 602.
236. See NAT’L PRISON PROJECT, supra note 25, at 23.
237. Id. at 32, 35.
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E. Similar Jurisdictional Hurdles: Climate-Related and COVID-19
Conditions Litigants Must Overcome Prison Litigation Reform Act
Barriers to Accessing Courts and Meaningful Remedies
The PLRA is a unique statute238 that singles out imprisoned and detained
individuals for substandard treatment under the law by (1) imposing
additional requirements on residents of prisons and jails who seek
injunctive relief against prison officials239 and (2) restricting available
relief.240 Any relief granted must be narrowly drawn and the least intrusive
means necessary to correct the harm,241 except that any relief that has the
effect of requiring release may only be ordered by way of a procedure that
has historically required decades to complete.242
As it was designed to do, the PLRA is effective at (1) preventing
residents of prisons and jails from bringing lawsuits challenging conditions
in federal court by requiring exhaustion of onerous administrative
grievance procedures and restricting the ability to file in forma pauperis;243
(2) preventing those who get to court and win from obtaining meaningful
injunctive and compensatory relief;244 and (3) preventing improvement in
prison conditions over time.245
238. The PLRA singles out a group of disfavored individuals for substandard legal
protections in federal courts. See generally Pub. L. No. 104-34, 110 Stat. 1321 (1995)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). Potentially only “enemy
combatants” have likewise been singled out for substandard legal protections in the federal
court system. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001) (containing the implied statutory authority, according to the Supreme Court
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 681, 708 (2006), to try “enemy combatants” outside of
Article III courts in extra-constitutional military commissions).
239. See, e.g., infra note 243; 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) (requiring prisoners to get certification
from Court of Appeals before filing successive habeas petition).
240. See, e.g., infra notes 242, 244, 245; 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).
241. See id.
242. Cases obtaining prisoner release orders from three-judge courts are exceptionally
rare and long lived. See, e.g., Plata v. Newsom, 455 F. Supp. 3d 557, 571 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
(upholding release order after decades of failing to comply with consent decrees in two
system-wide conditions cases brought on behalf of all California prison residents receiving
or requiring medical and dental care and with mental illnesses).
243. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (requiring that prisoners exhaust “such administrative
remedies as are available” before filing suit). Some courts have blessed grievance systems
that make it difficult or nearly impossible to achieve exhaustion at all or within a
meaningful timeframe. See, e.g., Wilson v. Epps, 776 F.3d 296, 300–01 (5th Cir. 2015)
(finding no fault with arduous grievance backlogging procedure in Mississippi prisons). The
PLRA’s “three strikes” provision also excludes prison residents from filing in forma
pauperis status if they have had cases dismissed on particular grounds. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(g).
244. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1) (barring courts from entering prospective relief in prison
conditions cases unless they “find[] that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further
than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial
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Some plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary relief in COVID-19 conditions
cases within the Clearinghouse subset were denied in whole or part because
of failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA or to satisfy
the prerequisites for a “prisoner release order.”246 In Valentine v. Collier,
plaintiffs living in a state geriatric prison sought a preliminary injunction
mandating COVID-19 mitigation measures, and the district court issued a
preliminary injunction.247 The Fifth Circuit stayed the preliminary
injunction pending completion of appellate review, decided that the
plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed because they did not comply with the
PLRA’s administrative exhaustion requirement and, in any event, their
Eighth Amendment claim was likely to fail on the merits.248
Circuit Judge Higginson’s concurring opinion staying the lower court’s
preliminary injunction noted that defendants were likely to succeed on their
claim that plaintiffs had failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the
PLRA and he would therefore not have reached the merits of plaintiffs
substantive claims.249 The Fifth Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction
because the defendants were likely to prevail on the merits in satisfying the
weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system
caused by the relief.”). The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have improperly held that
particularized need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings are required to support prospective
relief on a provision-by-provision basis, which holds relief hostage to a higher legal
standard than liability in many cases. Liability, for example, in Eighth Amendment cases is
determined according to a totality of the circumstances standard, but prospective relief in the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits may be struck down if the standard is not satisfied on an issueby-issue (or provision-by-provision) basis. Also, to obtain compensatory damages for
mental or emotional injuries, the PLRA requires that prevailing plaintiffs have suffered a
physical injury that caused their mental or emotional injuries. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
245. Particularized need-narrowness-intrusiveness findings on a provision-by-provision
basis are required to retain relief in the face of a motion to terminate. See Gates v. Cook,
376 F.3d 323, 336 n.8 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Jones v. Gusman, 296 F.R.D. 416, 455 (E.D.
La. 2013) (following Gates).
246. See e.g., Sanchez v. Brown, No. 20-cv-00832-E, 2020 WL 2615931, at *17 (N.D.
Tex. May 22, 2020) (finding that “[t]here is no evidence that the named Plaintiffs exhausted
the jail’s grievance procedure,” and that “[w]hile some of them started the process, they
filed this action before letting that process play out”; concluding that because “[e]xhaustion
is a prerequisite to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims[,] [t]heir failure to exhaust the appropriate
grievance procedures is fatal to their request for injunctive relief”); see also Nellson v.
Barnhart, No. 20-cv-00756-PAB, 2020 WL 3000961, at *6–8 (D. Colo. June 4, 2020)
(denying plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on June 4, 2020, citing plaintiffs’
failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA); Wragg v. Ortiz, 462 F. Supp.
3d 476, 505 (D.N.J. 2020) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction on
multiple grounds, including because plaintiffs had failed to exhaust both their Eighth
Amendment and RA claims).
247. See Preliminary Injunction Order at 4, Valentine v. Collier, No. 4:20-cv-01115 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 16, 2020) (granting preliminary injunction).
248. See Valentine I, 956 F.3d 797, 806 (5th Cir. 2020) (granting stay of preliminary
injunction).
249. See id. (Higginson, J., concurring).
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objective and subjective prongs of the deliberate indifference component of
their Eighth Amendment claim.
The Fifth Circuit granted defendants’ interlocutory appeal to vacate the
preliminary injunction,250 the district court granted plaintiffs’ request for a
permanent injunction, defendants appealed, and the Fifth Circuit stayed the
permanent injunction pending an appeal.251 The U.S. Supreme Court
denied two individuals’ applications to vacate the Fifth Circuit’s stay of the
permanent injunction.252 Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan,
dissented, concluding that “[t]he Fifth Circuit demonstrably erred with
respect to both the threshold issue of exhaustion under the PLRA and the
merits of the inmates’ Eighth Amendment claims.”253 As to the exhaustion
analysis, the dissenters noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that
“even if an internal process is ‘officially on the books,’ it is not ‘available’
if, as a practical matter, it ‘is not capable of use to obtain relief.’”254
In an analysis that will be critical to future plaintiffs seeking relief from
climate-related crises, the dissenters concluded that the Fifth Circuit erred
in determining that defendants’ 160-day grievance process was available to
plaintiffs grieving COVID-19-related conditions. They determined that the
administrative remedy procedure was not available to plaintiffs for grieving
COVID-19-related conditions, under Ross v. Blake,255 and therefore the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement was satisfied.256 The dissenters explained:
Given the speed at which the contagion spread, the 160-day grievance
process offered no realistic prospect of relief. In just 116 days, nearly 500
inmates contracted COVID-19, leading to 74 hospitalizations and 19
deaths. At least one inmate, Alvin Norris, died before the prison took any
steps in response to his grievance. Both Valentine and another inmate,
Gary Butaud, contracted COVID-19 while their grievances remained
pending.
The Fifth Circuit erred as a matter of law when it disregarded these
findings by the District Court. The Fifth Circuit seized on language in

250. See Valentine III, 960 F.3d 707, 707 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (vacating
preliminary injunction and remanding to district court for further proceedings on the
permanent injunction; consists of three separate concurring opinions with differing views on
the merits of the preliminary injunction).
251. See Valentine v. Collier, 490 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1174 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (granting
permanent injunction); see also Valentine v. Collier, 978 F.3d 154, 166 (5th Cir. 2020)
(granting stay of permanent injunction pending appeal).
252. See Valentine v. Collier, 141 S. Ct. 57, 57 (2020) (mem.) (denying application to
vacate stay).
253. Id. at 59 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
254. Id. (quoting Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 643 (2016)).
255. 578 U.S. 632, 643 (2016).
256. See Valentine, 141 S. Ct. at 59–60 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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Ross rejecting a judicially created exception to exhaustion for ‘‘special
circumstances,’’ and concluded that “special circumstances — even
threats posed by global pandemics — do not matter.” But the specialcircumstances exception rejected in Ross applied when inmates failed to
exhaust available remedies.257

Other courts in COVID-19-conditions litigation echoed the dissenters’
view that the nature of the COVID-19 epidemic rendered prolonged
grievance procedures unavailable and the exhaustion requirement thus
satisfied; these courts declined to grant preliminary relief on other grounds,
but their reasoning may guide future plaintiffs in climate-related conditions
suits who must seek preliminary relief before grievance procedures can be
exhausted.258
However, taken together, many unsuccessful COVID-19 cases brought
failed to survive on the basis of either (1) failure to establish the likelihood
of success as to the deliberate indifference element of an Eighth
Amendment claim; (2) failure to satisfy the PLRA requirements of a
prisoner release order or of exhaustion;259 or (3) both. The PLRA’s
jurisdictional restraints combined with the objective and subjective
deliberate indifference requirements of an Eighth Amendment claim are a
gauntlet: (1) the PLRA limits who gets into court; (2) the subjective
criminal recklessness requirement of the deliberative indifference standard
limits liability to defendants who have a low opinion of their own conduct;
(3) the PLRA limits the scope of court-ordered relief; and (4) the PLRA
limits the availability of lasting relief.260

257. Id. at 60 (quoting Ross, 578 U.S. at 642, 643).
258. See, e.g., Duvall v. Hogan, No. ELH-94-cv-02541, 2020 WL 3402301, at *8, *15
(D. Md. June 19, 2020) (denying plaintiffs’ motion for a TRO or preliminary injunction,
addressing the issue of exhaustion under the PLRA; explaining in the order that the
grievance system at the jail was unavailable for multiple reasons, one of which was that it
was composed of a four-step procedure that contained no deadlines and “therefore fails to
assure that an inmate’s grievance will be reviewed . . . before the inmate is affected by
COVID-19”); McPherson v. Lamont, 457 F. Supp. 3d 67, 81 (D. Conn. 2020) (wherein a
settlement was reached prior to a ruling on plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction,
but the court, in this Order, determined that, under Ross v. Blake, the administrative
remedies for the relief plaintiffs sought related to COVID- 19 mitigation were not available
because the grievance procedure can take up to 105 days to complete and lacks an
emergency review process).
259. The PLRA creates significant barriers to the courts for lower-functioning prison
residents who are more likely to need legal interventions and least likely to successfully
exhaust. See, e.g., Williams v. White, 724 F. App’x. 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2018) (holding
“there is no mental-capacity exception to the PLRA”). Since administrative procedures are
often strict and standardless at the same time, the PLRA exhaustion requirement often strips
prison and jail residents of legal rights — not privileges — arbitrarily. See, e.g., Gayle v.
Gonyea, 313 F.3d 677, 682 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing a “constitutional right to file a
grievance”).
260. See generally Fenster & Schlanger, supra note 186; Schlanger, supra note 186.
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Finally, for a court to order any relief that has the effect of requiring
release, a “prisoner release order” must be obtained from a specially
convened three-judge panel — a procedure that has historically taken
decades to complete.261 To obtain the relief of release under the PLRA, a
conditions plaintiff must first exhaust all available administrative
remedies,262 file suit, prevail in proving a violation of a federal right, and
win. Second, a court must order injunctive relief that is narrowly drawn
and the least intrusive means to correct the proven violation.263 Third, the
court order(s) must fail to remedy the deprivation of the federal right.264
Fourth, the court must give the defendant “a reasonable amount of time to
comply with the previous court orders.”265 Fifth, plaintiffs seeking to
correct the intractable rights violation by way of release or reducing the
prison or jail population, including through a population cap,266 must
request to convene a specially constituted “three-judge court,”267 which
alone has the authority under the PLRA to issue such an order.268 Sixth,
plaintiffs must prevail in arguing that the prisoner release order procedure
has been satisfied and that plaintiffs are entitled to relief in the form of a
release order, which itself must be narrowly drawn and the least intrusive
means to correct the long-standing violation.269
This procedure does not contemplate the needs of potential future
plaintiffs seeking to avoid, on an emergency basis, an imminent and
dangerous climate-related natural disaster. It contains no exception, even
for certain death.270 This PLRA procedure prompted petitioners in
COVID-19 conditions-based habeas cases to employ an array of terms
other than “release” to describe the relief they sought, to avoid a finding

261. Cases obtaining prisoner release orders from three-judge courts are exceptionally
rare and long lived. See, e.g., Plata v. Newsom, 455 F. Supp. 3d 557, 571 (N.D. Cal. 2020)
(upholding release order after decades of failing to comply with consent decrees in two
system-wide conditions cases brought on behalf of all California prison residents receiving
or requiring medical and dental care and with mental illnesses).
262. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
263. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).
264. See id. § 3626(a)(3)(A)(i).
265. See id. §§ 3626(a)(3)(A)(i), (ii).
266. See id.; see also id. § 3626(g)(4).
267. Id. § 3626(a)(3)(B).
268. See id.
269. See id. § 3626(a)(2).
270. The statement is extreme but accurate. Upon proof of the likelihood of death to the
point of certainty absent release, a court could find defendants were violating a resident’s
constitutional rights and order defendants to act or not act in particular ways, but the PLRA
would still require death before release if the (potentially decades-long) three-judge court
procedure had not yet been satisfied. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-34, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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that the PLRA prohibited courts from exercising their release authority
under habeas statutes because the underlying violation of federal law
alleged was a violation of a right relating to prison conditions.271
The observed low rate of success of conditions-based habeas petitions
within the Clearinghouse subset — considered in conjunction with the
PLRA’s mandatory three-judge court process required to secure release —
sets up the final issues addressed in this Article: What populations are very
likely to encounter serious or life-threatening climate-related harm during
confinement, and among them, what prison or jail conditions litigants are
likely to have the most difficulty obtaining preliminary relief?
F. Overexposed and Underprotected: Black U.S. Residents in Custody in
the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits May Be Overexposed to ClimateRelated Harms and Underprotected by Federal Courts
The preceding observations about outcomes in the Clearinghouse subset
cases — when considered together with geographic projections of future
climate change-related harm — strongly suggest that prison and jail
residents living in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, who are
disproportionately Black U.S. residents, will be particularly disadvantaged
when seeking preliminary relief from climate-related crises.
This
conclusion is based on observations about (1) outcomes in the
Clearinghouse subset; (2) geographic projections of climate-related harm;
and (3) demographic data describing populations in states within the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits.
First, this conclusion is supported by a number of observations about a
number of observations about the 70 Clearinghouse subset cases:272
1. Three circuit courts vacated COVID-19-mitigating preliminary
injunctions granted by district courts: the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit,
and the Eleventh Circuit.273 These decisions will act as firm ceilings on the

271. For example, in Grinis v. Spaulding, the federal district court held that a conditionsbased habeas petition was not cognizable because the PLRA applied to petitioners’ request
for release due to unconstitutional conditions; in doing so, the court commented on
petitioners’ avoidance of the term “release”:
[Petitioners] themselves say they do not necessarily want to be released, a very
odd thing for habeas petitioners to say. This action is thus revealed as a false flag
operation. Flying the banner of habeas corpus, it is nevertheless in substance a
“civil action with respect to prison conditions” that seeks the entry of a “prisoner
release order” as those terms are defined in the PLRA.
No. 20-cv-10738, 2020 WL 3097360-GAO, at *4 (D. Mass. June 11, 2020).
272. “Cases” in this list refers to cases and petitions within the Clearinghouse subset.
273. See Valentine III, 960 F.3d 707, 707 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (vacating
preliminary injunction); see also Cameron v. Bouchard, 815 F. App’x 978 (6th Cir. 2020)
(vacating preliminary injunction); Wilson v. Williams, 961 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2020)
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frequency and scope of preliminary relief that district courts in these
circuits will risk ordering in future prison conditions cases.
2. No cases within the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits successfully
obtained court-ordered preliminary relief, which was not later stayed and
vacated.
3. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits do not recognize the availability of
conditions-based habeas petitions to seek release, or its equivalents, to
remedy unlawful conditions of confinement.274
4. The Fifth Circuit’s opinions in Valentine (I–III) regarding objective
deliberate indifference (substantial risk of serious arm) and exhaustion (that
Ross held actual unavailability was still non-exhaustion) stand out as
defendant-friendly to the point of open heavy-handedness, even in the
context of Fifth Circuit deliberate indifference case law.275
5. In PLRA case law, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits are substantially
more draconian in their application of the needs-necessity-narrowness
limitation on injunctive relief, which greatly limits the availability, scope,
and longevity of relief that may be ordered.
Second, this conclusion is based on a number of observations about on a
number of observations about projections of climate-related harm:
1. Climate change will impact the entire United States but differently
according to geographic location and impact type. Certain climate changerelated harms, not all,276 will fall harder in the region of the Southeast/Gulf

(vacating preliminary injunction); Swain v. Junior, 958 F.3d 1081, 1089 (11th Cir. 2020)
(per curiam) (vacating preliminary injunction).
274. See Davis v. Fechtel, 150 F.3d 486, 490 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Swain, 958 F.3d at
1086 n.1; Vaz v. Skinner, 634 F. App’x 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is not the appropriate vehicle for raising an inadequate medical care claim, as such a
claim challenges the conditions of confinement, not the fact or duration of that
confinement.”). The Sixth Circuit has said both. See Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714
(6th Cir. 2004); see also Adams v. Bradshaw, 644 F.3d 481, 482–83 (6th Cir. 2011) (per
curiam) (holding that a state prisoner’s Eighth Amendment challenge to the state of Ohio’s
lethal injection procedures was appropriate in the context of a habeas petition).
275. Courts’ analyses of subjective deliberate indifference (disregard; no reasonable
measures taken) were brutal to plaintiffs in cases across the United States, so this Article
does not single out any particular case or court as being the least helpful on the subjective
deliberate indifference analysis.
276. This Article focuses on climate change vulnerabilities in the U.S. South and part of
the Rust Belt (the Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits). A notable exception is wildfires,
which are predicted to burn more frequently across the Western United States, falling
primarily within the geographic bounds of the Ninth and Tenth Circuits. One of the
ProPublica Maps, reproduced in the Appendix C as Figure 3, depicts the predicted
prevalence of large wildfires between 2040 and 2071. The authors explain: “With heat and
evermore prevalent drought, the likelihood that very large wildfires (ones that burn over
12,000 acres) will affect U.S. regions increases substantially, particularly in the West,
Northwest and the Rocky Mountains, but also in Florida, Georgia and the Southeast,” such
that “[b]y midcentury, the northern Great Basin . . . will become the epicenter of large
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Coast states, within the Fifth Circuits and Eleventh Circuits, where
COVID-19 conditions litigation outcomes suggest federal courts may be
less inclined to grant emergency relief in the face of natural disasters or
emergent public health crises.
2. For example, as climate change progresses, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change predicts that the sea level will rise over time; this
will in turn make storm surge flooding during hurricanes more
devastating.277 Increased sea surface temperatures will cause hurricanes
and tropical storms to be more destructive, with higher wind speeds and an
increased ability to produce extreme rainfall.278 Storm surges and intense
rainfall, together, will cause more frequent and more devasting flooding,279
particularly in the Gulf Coast.
3. There is also an increased geographic-based risk of harm from climate
change to states in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits,280 including due to (1)
extreme combined humidity plus heat (“wet bulb” conditions);281 (2)
extreme heat;282 (3) northward climate-related migration;283 (4) sea level
rise;284 and (5) being exposed to multiple instrumentalities of increased
climate-related harm.285
Third, this conclusion is based on a number of observations about racial
demographics in states within the Fifth Circuit:
1. The Fifth Circuit is unique in that people of color comprise a majority
of the jurisdiction’s general population.286 Black Americans make up 17%
of the Fifth Circuit’s population, Asians make up 4.3%, and Hispanics
make up 32%, such that a combined 55% of people who live within the

wildfires” that can “easily rip through 10,000 acres a day with strong winds.” Al Shaw et al.,
supra note 49.
277. See Hurricanes and Climate Change, UCAR CTR. FOR SCI. EDUC.,
https://scied.ucar.edu/learning-zone/climate-change-impacts/hurricanes-and-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/2FFJ-MR2T] (last visited Jan. 11, 2021).
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. See app. D, fig.4.
281. See app. E, fig.5.
282. See app. F, fig.6.
283. See app. G, fig.7.
284. See app. H, fig.8.
285. See app. I, fig.9.
286. See Examining the Demographic Compositions of U.S. Circuit and District Courts,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 13, 2020, 12:01 AM), https://www.
americanprogress.org/issues/courts/reports/2020/02/13/480112/examining-demographiccompositions-u-s-circuit-district-courts/ [https://perma.cc/QP78-2D82] (stating that “people
of color comprise a majority of the jurisdiction’s general population”).
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Fifth Circuit are people of color.287 However, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals is among the least racially and ethnically diverse Circuit Court in
the country; white judges comprise 85% of all sitting judges.288
2. The states with the largest numbers of Black residents in the country
are Texas, Florida, and Georgia,289 all of which are in the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits.
3. The Fifth Circuit is comprised of the states of Texas, Mississippi, and
Louisiana.290 It is comprised of the state with the single largest Black
population, Texas, and two out of the three states with the highest Black
percentage populations: Mississippi and Louisiana.291 Thirty-eight percent
of Mississippians identify as Black, making it the state with the highest
proportion of Black residents in the country.292 Texas has the most U.S.
Hispanic-identifying residents — 11.5 million.293
4. In Louisiana, Black people represent 67% of all people incarcerated in
state prisons, which is twice the percentage of Black Americans who reside
in the state of Louisiana.294 In Mississippi, 62% of the state’s prison

287. See id. (pulling from U.S. Census Bureau statistics on racial groups within Texas,
Mississippi, and Louisiana).
288. See id.
289. See, e.g., TAMIR, supra note 116, at 13 (finding that the last available data, from
2019, shows that Texas has 3.9 million Black people in the state making it the state with the
most Black people, followed by Florida with 3.8 million Black people, and then Georgia
with 3.6 million Black people).
290. See Examining the Demographic Compositions of U.S. Circuit and District Courts,
supra note 286.
291. See, e.g., Michael Harriot, Where Did All the White People Go? Ranking the
Blackest and Whitest Places in America, According to the New Census Data, ROOT (Aug.
17, 2021, 9:00 AM), https://www.theroot.com/where-did-all-the-white-people-go-rankingthe-blackest-1847496551[https://perma.cc/5R8L-FA4Q] (using 2020 U.S. Census data to
rank the Black Population Percentage by State found that Mississippi was the state with the
highest Black population by percent at 37.8%, followed by Georgia at 34.2%, then
Louisiana at 33.5%); see also TAMIR, supra note 116, at 13 (finding that Texas has 3.9
million Black people in the state making it the state, numerically with the most Black
people).
292. See, e.g., Harriot, supra note 291 (using 2020 U.S. Census data to rank the Black
Population Percentage by State they found that aside from the District of Columbia,
Mississippi was the state with the highest Black population by percent at 37.8%, followed
by Georgia at 34.2%, then Louisiana at 33.5%, then Maryland at 33%, then Alabama at
27.1%).
293. See, e.g., Jens Manuel Krogstad, Hispanics Have Accounted for More than Half of
Total U.S. Population Growth Since 2010, PEW RSCH. CTR. (July 10, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/10/hispanics-have-accounted-for-morethan-half-of-total-u-s-population-growth-since-2010/
[https://perma.cc/H9SX-R2NR]
(following only California, which has 15.6 million Hispanic people, Texas is second with
11.5 million Hispanics).
294. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., INCARCERATION
TRENDS IN LOUISIANA 2, https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarceration-
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population are Black.295 In Texas, Black people account for 33% of the
incarcerated population, even though they are only 13% of the state
population.296 Hispanic people in Texas state prisons also account for 33%
of all those incarcerated in state prisons.297 White people, while
representing 44% of the Texas state population, only account for 33% of
the prison population.298
Finally, this conclusion is based on a number of observations about
racial demographics in states within the Eleventh Circuit:
1. The Eleventh Circuit is comprised of the states of Alabama, Georgia,
and Florida.299
2. Georgia has the second-highest Black population of any state by
percentage.300 Georgia likewise has the third-highest number of Black
people of any state, with 3.6 million Black people.301 Within Georgia’s
prisons, Black people represent 60% of the state prison population,
although they are only 34.2% of the overall state population.302 While

trends-louisiana.pdf [https://perma.cc/82RQ-WDB3] (last visited Jan. 11, 2022) (showing
that Black people make up 67% of everybody incarcerated in Louisiana state prisons while
they only account for 33% of the state population; white people make up 60% of the state
population but only 33% of those incarcerated in state prisons).
295. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., INCARCERATION
TRENDS
IN
MISSISSIPPI
2,
https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/stateincarceration-trends-mississippi.pdf [https://perma.cc/3EY3-KTV5] (last visited Jan. 11,
2022) (providing statistical data showing that Black people are incarcerated in Mississippi at
2.5 times the rate of white people and comprise 62% of the state prison population and 57%
of the jail population across the state).
296. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., INCARCERATION
TRENDS IN TEXAS, https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarcerationtrends-texas.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DJ9-XEV6] (last visited Jan. 11, 2022) (finding that
while Black people only constitute 13% of all state residents they represent 33% of all those
incarcerated in Texas state prisons).
297. See id.
298. See id. (finding that Black people are incarcerated at 3.4 times the rate of white
people in Texas).
299. See Examining the Demographic Compositions of U.S. Circuit and District Courts,
supra note 286.
300. See, e.g., Harriot, supra note 291 (using 2020 U.S. Census data to rank the Black
Population Percentage by State ranked Mississippi as the state with the highest Black
population by percent at 37.8%, and is followed by Georgia at 34.2%, and then Louisiana at
33.5%).
301. See, e.g., TAMIR, supra note 116 (finding that from the most recent census data, 3.6
million Black people reside in Georgia).
302. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., INCARCERATION
TRENDS IN GEORGIA 2, https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/state-incarcerationtrends-georgia.pdf [https://perma.cc/JXQ9-4E7N] (last visited Jan. 11, 2022) (finding that
Black people are incarcerated at 2.1 times the rate of white people and account for 60% of
the state prison population).
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white people represent 54% of Georgia’s population, they account for only
36% of the state prison population.303
3. Alabama has the fifth-highest Black population by percentage, with
27% of its population identifying as Black.304 However, Black people
comprise 54% of its state prison population.305
4. Florida has the second-highest Black population of any state by
population, with 3.8 million people living in Florida that identify as
Black.306 Black people represent 17% of Florida’s state population, yet
Black people represent 47% of its state prison population.307 Florida
likewise has the third-highest amount of Hispanics of any state in the
country, with 5.7 million people identifying as Latino.308 White people are
significantly underrepresented in Florida’s prison system: white people
represent 54% of the entire state population but only 40% of the state
prison population.309 Black people in Florida are incarcerated at 3.6 times
the rate of white people.310
5. The Eleventh Circuit bench is composed of primarily white judges:
90% of the sitting judges on the Eleventh Circuit are white.311 Within the
Eleventh Circuit, 45% of the population is people of color.312

303. See id.
304. See, e.g., Harriot, supra note 291 (compiling 2020 U.S. Census data to rank the
Black population percentage by state revealed that Mississippi was the state with the highest
Black population by percent at 37.8%, followed by Georgia at 34.2%, then Louisiana at
33.5%, then Maryland at 33%, and then Alabama at 27.1%).
305. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., INCARCERATION
TRENDS IN ALABAMA 1–2, https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/stateincarceration-trends-alabama.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5HP-F8FU] (last visited Jan. 11, 2022)
(finding that Black people make up 54% of the state prison population and are incarcerated
at 2.8 times the rate of white people).
306. See, e.g., TAMIR, supra note 116 (finding that from the most recent census data, only
Texas has more Black people than Florida with 3.9 million people, and Florida has 3.8
million Black people residing in the state).
307. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., INCARCERATION
TRENDS
IN
FLORIDA
1–2,
https://www.vera.org/downloads/pdfdownloads/stateincarceration-trends-florida.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PKZ-ZCX9] (last visited Jan. 11, 2022)
(finding that Black people make up 47% of the state prison population and are incarcerated
at 3.6 times the rate of white people in Florida).
308. See, e.g., Krogstad, supra note 293 (following California and Texas, “Florida has
5.7 million Latinos, the third-highest total in the country”).
309. See, e.g., HENRICHSON ET AL., supra note 307 (finding that Black people are
incarcerated at 3.6 times the rate of white people in Florida).
310. See id.
311. See Examining the Demographic Compositions of U.S. Circuit and District Courts,
supra note 286 (finding that most of the judges within the Eleventh Circuit are white,
including 90% of sitting judges and 80% of active judges).
312. See id. (“looking at the combined populations of these three states, one finds that
people of color and women comprise approximately 45 percent and 51 percent of the
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CONCLUSION
COVID-19 prison and jail conditions litigation provides insights into
how federal courts may respond when prison residents seek preliminary
relief from emergent climate-related dangers. An observation of outcomes
and trends from the 70 COVID-19 prison and jail conditions cases in the
Clearinghouse subset — combined with information about projected
impact zones of climate-related harms — suggests that prison and jail
residents in most parts of the country will have difficulty using the courts to
obtain emergency relief to prevent climate-related harms, and that residents
in and around the U.S. South and Gulf Coast, who are more likely to be
Black, may have more difficulty using the courts to obtain preliminary
relief to prevent climate-related injuries and harms.than others. In short,
Black prison and jail residents are overrepresented within an
underprotected population that is uniquely at risk of climate-related harm
due to geographic location..
There are three major mechanisms by which climate change is likely to
materially increase the risk of serious harm to prison and jail residents: by
(1) creating or exacerbating unconstitutional conditions caused by chronic
understaffing; (2) making facilities more dangerous; and (3) causing
increased racial disparity in imprisonment. Understaffing is a root cause of
many unconstitutional conditions in prisons,313 and climate change will
make it even harder to staff prisons if projections are accurate regarding
shrinking economies in the states with the highest rates of incarceration,
which are expected to be among the most affected by climate-changerelated harms. Facility-related hazards will become more dangerous and
disruptive as will institutional unrest or interpersonal violence triggered by
the pain and stress of living in environmentally dangerous conditions.314
Racial disparities in imprisonment will increase315 because the effects of

general population,” with Black people making up 21.5%, Asians making up 3%, and
Latinos making up 18.5% of these combined state populations).
313. In April 2019, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division issued a report
in which it cited the ADOC for “egregious” and “dangerous” systemwide understaffing that
contributed to likely violations of the Eighth Amendment rights of Alabama prisoners. See
ALABAMA’S STATE PRISONS INVESTIGATION, supra note 8, at 9–10.
314. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 19, at 2-6, 2-2 (“[T]he BOP must ensure
that prisons continue to function in the case of energy disruption, heat waves, drought, or
coastal storm impacts,” and plan for “[d]isruption of operations resulting from potential
unrest (and increased violence) among populations affected by severe weather, extreme
heat, and drought.” (emphasis removed)).
315. See, e.g., LOONEY & TURNER, supra note 68, at 2, 12 (finding that (1) “boys from the
poorest families are 40 times more likely to end up in prison compared to boys from the
richest families”; (2) “there are more men in prison from the bottom 1 percent than from the
top 15 percent of the income distribution”; and (3) “individuals incarcerated in their early
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past and present systemic racial discrimination within the criminal legal
system will be exacerbated by the additional downward economic and
social pressures projected to accompany climate change.316
Future climate-change-related prison and jail conditions litigation will
likely be based on, or at least cite extensively to, COVID-19 pandemicrelated prison and jail conditions litigation. Both are public health crises on
global scales that will cause greater harm to populations of imprisoned
people due to irreducible realities of congregate imprisonment and because
imprisonment prohibits residents from taking rational risk-reducing
measures to protect themselves. In both contexts, the same types of legal
actions, claims, and jurisdictional hurdles apply.
Because COVID-19-related prison and jail conditions litigation provides
a predictive window into likely challenges facing future climate changerelated litigation, the Authors derive the following insights and
recommendations.
1. Climate-change-related prison and jail conditions litigation is, in most
geographic areas, unlikely to be an effective bulwark against the chronic,
increasing risk of harm to prison and jail residents attributable to climate
change.
2. Prison and jail residents in geographic areas with the lowest likelihood
of winning meaningful court intervention in climate change-related
litigation will also be among the most vulnerable of all prison and jail
residents due to their geographic location and the anticipated impacts of
climate migration.
3. Given the high volume of recent judicial appointments on the federal
bench, it is unlikely that circuit courts that took a less protective posture
towards prison and jail residents during the COVID-19 pandemic will
become more protective of prison residents in future climate-related
litigation — it is more likely that even sympathetic circuits will become
less so.
4. Observations about outcomes in the Clearinghouse subset cases —
when considered together with geographic projections of future climate
change-related harm — suggest that prison and jail residents living in the
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, who are disproportionately Black U.S.
residents, may be particularly disadvantaged when seeking preliminary
relief from climate-related crises.

30s are much more likely to have grown up in poverty, in single parent families, and in
neighborhoods of concentrated economic distress and with large minority populations”).
316. See, e.g., Islam & Winkel, supra note 74, at 2 (“[T]he relationship between climate
change and social inequality is characterized by a vicious cycle, whereby initial inequality
makes disadvantaged groups suffer disproportionately from the adverse effects of climate
change, resulting in greater subsequent inequality.”).
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To effectively confront the hazards that climate change poses to prison
and jail residents, litigation must be one tool among many, and it is
unlikely to be a reliably powerful one in the near future. Because harms
suffered by prison and jail residents are suffered by their families and
communities, the scope of the means to confront the harm — the most
effective of which is decarceration — can likewise be community-wide in
scope. For example, one effective way to help prison and jail residents
avoid the harms of climate change is to increase efforts and resources
expended on phasing in alternatives to imprisonment as a punishment for
most crimes and simultaneously diverting funds used for imprisonment to
(a) build local capacity to facilitate restorative justice alternatives to
imprisonment according to terms set by survivors and their communities;317
(b) pay survivors of crime cash compensation (up front from diversion
dollars, not restitution) which they can immediately use to replace lost
goods, cover crime-related medical expenses, or to pay for services to help

317. For example, the non-profit organization Common Justice operates a data-driven
and survivor-centered restorative justice-based program that offers an alternative to
incarceration for people who have committed violent crimes that is prescribed by the
individuals who they hurt. Survivors of violent crimes who opt to participate in the program
then set terms of program-completion which, if satisfied, they believe will result in holding
the person who hurt them accountable and less likely to hurt others in the same way. Both
the survivor and the responsible person are provided with services for healing and
rehabilitation. See COMMON JUST., https://www.commonjustice.org [https://perma.cc/83VRRGWQ] (last visited Jan. 16, 2022) (explaining that Common Justice “operate[s] the first
alternative-to-incarceration and victim-service program in the United States that focuses on
violent felonies in the adult courts”); see also New Solutions for Violent Crime: Common
Justice at the Vera Institute of Justice, VERA INST. JUST., https://nycourts.
gov/ip/justiceforchildren/PDF/RestorativePracticeConf/J3-Sered-New_Solutions_
Violent_Crime.pdf [https://perma.cc/2T2D-5ALP] (lasted visited Jan. 16, 2022) (explaining
that Common Justice “brings together . . . the harmed party (victim), the responsible party
(perpetrator), and family and community members with a stake in the outcome — for a faceto-face dialogue to agree on sanctions other than incarceration to hold the responsible party
accountable in ways meaningful to the person harmed,” and that “[t]hese agreements —
which include everything from education and employment to public speaking engagements
and restitution to those harmed — replace the lengthy prison sentences the responsible
parties would otherwise have served”); Common Justice: New Solutions for Violent Crimes,
ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.rwjf.org/en/library
/research/2014/10/common-justice—new-solutions-for-violent-crimes.html
[https://perma.cc/CZ5U-B6KN] (providing that, during Common Justice’s grant period with
the grantor, most responsible parties had graduated from the program; “[f]ewer than 5
percent had been terminated and sentenced for new crimes”; and quoting a responsible party
(perpetrator) as explaining his or her perspective: “You owe your harmed party twice: once
for what you did, and once for the chance they gave you to make it right. And both debts
take your whole life to repay”); Common Justice, The Fourth Guiding Principles for
Making Our Cities Safer, YOUTUBE (May 4, 2020), https://youtu.be/EQ3oyZ9w0fo
[https://perma.cc/B2ZM-BC69] (discussing the framework informing their program, which
is that solutions to violence should be (1) survivor centered; (2) accountability based; (3)
safety driven; and (4) and racially equitable).
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them recover and heal; (3) pay for rehabilitating responsible individuals
who commit crimes so that they can live safely in the community; and (4)
fund crime prevention technologies and supportive programs in the
community in which the crime took place.318 Communities will be safer
than they are now, including as the frequency and scope of climate-related
harms increase across the United States, if crime survivors are made whole
when they get hurt; if responsible parties are rehabilitated and held
responsible; and if addressing the root causes of crime and of climate
change are prioritized over punishment.
However, so long as we have community members locked in prisons and
jails who are disproportionately vulnerable to harm due to climate-related
events, conditions-related litigation of the types described in this Article
will be necessary. Given their outcomes on average, practitioners seeking
future relief from climate change-related risks may wish to frame climaterelated conditions cases, at the outset, as distinguishable from COVID-19
conditions cases in jurisdictions where unhelpful cases were decided or
where relief granted was overturned.
First, the Authors suggest vigorously anticipating and undermining
subjective deliberate indifference arguments, which pose the most danger
of defeating confined plaintiffs’ cases relating to climate change. Describe
how the future harm your clients seek relief from was predicted and
predictable; provide for how prison officials have long known about the
substantial risk that this particular climate-related hazard would cause
serious harm. Avoid describing the hazard as ‘unprecedented’ or
fundamentally ‘unpredictable.’ If the event anticipated in fact threatens
harm in excess of any previous similar event, consider making the case that
the magnitude still falls well within the range of substantially likely harm
— the risk of which is well known to prison or jail officials.
The scale of the threat posed must be tied to the scope of the remedy
sought. But for residents seeking relief based on a claim or an allegation of
an Eighth Amendment violation, making the argument it is a tightrope.
Plaintiffs may need to seek rare or novel remedies in the face of potentially
catastrophic climate-related harm, including emergency evacuation,

318. For example, local “credible messenger” violence interrupter programs based on the
Cure Violence model have been shown to reduce rates and incidence violence; such
programs are led by individuals who have previously been convicted of crimes, and who
have the expertise to deliver violence-prevention services — before harm occurs — within
the communities they know and serve. See, e.g., CURE VIOLENCE GLOB., https://cvg.org
[https://perma.cc/9MSC-CK4L] (last visited Jan. 16, 2022); Seyma Bayram, Credible
Messengers Closer to Hitting Streets to Prevent Violence in Jackson, JACKSON FREE PRESS
(Nov. 27, 2019, 10:02 AM), https://www.jacksonfreepress.com/news/2019/nov/27/crediblemessengers-closer-hitting-streets/ [https://perma.cc/2YTJ-J4NZ] (exemplifying a local
credible messenger program based on the Cure Violence model).
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relocation, or immediate release to save imminently threatened lives.
These same plaintiffs, however, must avoid making the argument that
prison or jail officials face a truly rare or novel threat. This is doubly
difficult when seeking pre-merits relief because of the higher burden of
persuasion.
Because of the difficulty of pre-harm litigation, the Authors suggest
identifying and pursuing discrete pre-harm mitigation goals via (1) targeted
advocacy efforts, and (2) discrete non-systemic conditions litigation when
claims are cognizable, should advocacy efforts fail. As examples, these
methods may be applied to improving facility preparedness and improving
harm abatement mechanisms.
1. Improving facility plans. Prison and jail officials can avoid Eighth
Amendment liability by, in essence, establishing that they negligently
implemented an inadequate mitigation plan which they believed to be
adequate at the time. As a harm-reduction measure, consider helping them
to adopt better plans and implementation procedures: for mass evacuation;
relocation; contingency plans for prolonged loss of food or utilities;
protocols for swiftly identifying and tracking residents with serious medical
conditions or disabilities; procedures for effectively communicating with
residents in an emergency. Inclined advocates could offer to help raise
money for an expert consultant to develop better preparedness plans. If
officials decline, advocates should make a detailed record of how officials
were apprised of their current plan’s inadequacies—should you need to
litigate subjective deliberate indifference in the future.319
2. Improving harm abatement mechanisms. Talk to residents of facilities
in your area to create a list of the most likely mechanisms of serious harm
to them due to climate change. Pursue mitigation of the worst ones
however practicable. If advocacy efforts fail, heat-related conditions
claims provide a template for how mechanism-specific climate-related
cases can proceed, including on thorny constitutional grounds.320 Also,

319. Of interest is whether jailed and incarcerated people in certain localities currently
suffer enough of the same climate-related harms such that they could theoretically sue on
the basis of an inadequate plan alone — as itself posing a substantially likely risk of serious
harm — separate from any impending or ongoing crisis, similar to conditions litigation
challenging the lack of adequate suicide prevention procedures as a violation of Eighth
Amendment guarantees.
320. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002); Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584,
596 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding that housing death row residents in very hot cells without
access to heat-relief measures while knowing that each suffers from medical conditions
which render them “extremely vulnerable to serious heat-related injury” violates the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment); Hinojosa v. Livingston, 807 F.3d 657,
666 (5th Cir. 2015) (referencing that between 2007 and 2012 13 people died in Texas state
prisons from heat-related causes); Blackmon v. Garza, 484 F. App’x 866, 867 (5th Cir.
2012); Brock v. Warren Cnty., 713 F. Supp. 238, 243 (E.D. Tenn. 1989).
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consider suits seeking harm-reducing measures that are designed to be
resolved on the merits. Unlike the Clearinghouse subset cases analyzed in
this Article, these would not be held to a higher burden of persuasion. If
discrete enough, such cases can induce early settlement if adopting the
harm-reducing measure is less expensive than litigating the case through
the merits. Such suits would be non-systemic and seek clear, discrete,
concrete relief, such as for fire alarms and posted evacuation plans that
residents with disabilities can follow, or for a policy that provides residents
with mobility impairments the option to be housed on a ground floor. Such
claims must be cognizable but may not be clear winners; however, if
framed realistically, they may have modest cumulative harm-reducing
impacts, particularly if actions seeking narrow relief can be resolved more
often and earlier by mediation or agreement. Separately, research whether
any state laws, regulations, or building code sections can be leveraged to
require that a facility be better prepared for the type of climate crises
endemic to your area. For example, in geographic areas prone to deepfreezes or floods, perhaps facilities could be required, if not convinced, to
maintain a two-day supply of bottled water and food for every resident
held. In facilities where, during the COVID-19 pandemic, a lack of
effective communication between residents and administrators was a factor
contributing to low vaccination rates, perhaps advocates could offer to raise
resources for an outside facilitator to help establish a joint body of
administrative and resident leadership to co-plan around emergency
preparedness — to ensure that residents have the information and
opportunities that they need to take care of themselves and each other as
well as can be hoped for in a climate-related crisis.
Decarceration, through restorative justice alternatives or otherwise, is the
ethical and most effective way to prevent unnecessary climate changerelated harm to our community members living in prisons and jails. But so
long as people remain incarcerated, detained, and at increased risk of harm,
we can undertake constructive efforts to pursue mitigation opportunities,
wherever we can find or make them, and we can prepare for the certainty
that we will need to litigate climate-related prison and jail conditions cases
more often and urgently moving forward.
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APPENDIX A

Figure 1: Map of “Economic Damages from Climate: 2040–2060.” The
ProPublica authors explain that climate change “will have a larger
proportional impact in rural places like Gulf County, Florida (C), which
might lose half its economy,” and that factors such as “[r]ising energy
costs, lower labor productivity, poor crop yields and increasing crime are
among the climate-driven elements that will increasingly drag on the U.S.
economy, eventually taking a financial toll that exceeds that from the
COVID-19 pandemic in some regions.”321

321. Al Shaw et al., supra note 49.
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APPENDIX B

Figure 2: Map of “Farm Crop Yields: 2040–2060.” The ProPublica authors
explain: “With rising temperatures, it will become more difficult to grow
food;” using corn and soy as indicator crops, the ProPublica authors project
their production will “decrease for every degree of warming. By
midcentury, North Dakota A, which already harvests millions of acres of
both crops, will warm enough to allow for more growing days and higher
yields. But parts of Texas and Oklahoma B may see yields drop by more
than 70%.”322

322. Id.
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APPENDIX C

Figure 3: Map of “Large Wildfires: 2040–2071.” The ProPublica authors
explain: “With heat and evermore prevalent drought, the likelihood that
very large wildfires (ones that burn over 12,000 acres) will affect U.S.
regions increases substantially, particularly in the West, Northwest and the
Rocky Mountains, but also in Florida, Georgia and the Southeast,” such
that “[b]y midcentury, the northern Great Basin . . . will become the
epicenter of large wildfires” that can “easily rip through 10,000 acres a day
with strong winds.”323

323. Id.
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APPENDIX D

Figure 4: Geographic Boundaries of United States Courts of Appeals and
United States District Courts.324

324. Geographic Boundaries of United States Courts of Appeals and United States
District Courts, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/federal-courtspublic/court-website-links [https://perma.cc/T7GF-F4TD] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021).
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APPENDIX E

Figure 5: Map of “Extreme Heat and Humidity” that the ProPublica authors
describe as “wet bulb” temperatures:325
When heat meets excessive humidity, the body can no longer cool itself
by sweating. That combination creates wet bulb temperatures, where 82
degrees can feel like southern Alabama on its hottest day, making it

325. Health risks posed by heat and humidity are extremely relevant in the prison
conditions context. The ProPublica authors explain their climate change relevance: Today
“the combination of truly dangerous heat and humidity is rare,” but by “2050, parts of the
Midwest and Louisiana could see conditions that make it difficult for the human body to
cool itself for nearly one out of every 20 days in the year,” and “[a]ll the while, sea level rise
will transform the coasts.” Al Shaw et al., supra note 49. “By midcentury, heat and humidity
in Missouri (A) will feel like Louisiana does today, while some areas we don’t usually think
of as humid, like southwestern Arizona (B), will see soaring wet bulb temperatures because
of factors like sun angle, wind speed and cloud cover reacting to high temperatures . . . .” Id.
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dangerous to work outdoors . . . . As wet bulb temperatures increase even
higher, so will the risk of heat stroke — and even death. 326

326. Id.
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APPENDIX F

Figure 6: Temperature map showing that “between 2040 and 2060 extreme
temperatures will become commonplace in the South and Southwest, with
some counties in Arizona experiencing temperatures above 95 degrees for
half the year.”327

327. Id.
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APPENDIX G

Figure 7: Map indicating likely net northward climate-related migration
over time.328

328. Id.
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APPENDIX H

Figure 8: Map of “Sea Level Rise: 2040–2060.” The ProPublica authors
explain: “As sea levels rise, the share of property submerged by high tides
increases dramatically, affecting a small sliver of the nation’s land but a
disproportionate share of its population,” and that “some 50 million
Americans live in eight of the largest U.S. metro areas — Miami (A), New
York (B) and Boston (C) among them — which all lie in some of the most
affected counties in the U.S.”329

329. Id.
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Figure 9: A partial image of a large table entitled “The Greatest Climate
Risk? Compounding Calamities.” In it, the ProPublica authors list all
counties in the United States and provide each counties’ relative risk of
harm from specific climate-related dangers.330 We draw two data points in
our analysis of COVID-19 prison conditions cases from this table. We use
it to designate certain outcomes as (1) in geographic areas that bear an
above-average risk of climate-related harm in at least one risk category,
meaning a score of above a 5; and/or (2) in a geographic area that bears an
above-average risk of climate-related harm in three or more risk categories.

330. Id.

